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ON THE PRICING EFFECT OF EARNINGS QUALITY 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to examine the interplay between earnings quality, information 
risk and cost of equity capital. Total accruals quality metric which is a numerical estimation 
based on a firm’s residual accruals is used to depict earnings quality in this thesis. Total ac-
cruals quality is further decomposed into innate accruals quality and discretionary accruals 
quality in order to examine their pricing implications separately. The thesis contributes to the 
ongoing discussion of whether firm-specific information risk is a priced risk factor, and what 
is the mechanism through which information risk affects expected returns.  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The thesis employs an extensive sample of data drawn from the US market in 1970–2006. 
The earnings quality proxies used in the study rely solely on accounting data, which are re-
trieved from Compustat North America Annual file. These proxies are used to construct fac-
tor mimicking portfolios, whose returns represent the exposure to that particular risk factor. 
The monthly firm returns data are retrieved from CRSP Monthly Stock file and the other re-
turn items are retrieved from Wharton Research Data Services (wrds). Asset-pricing method-
ology is then applied to study the effect of total accruals quality, innate accruals quality and 
discretionary accruals quality on expected returns. 
RESULTS 
The results provide consistent evidence that total accruals quality is a priced risk factor. The 
main results from two-stage cross-sectional regressions do not have implications as regards 
the magnitude of the accruals quality risk premium, but the average positive coefficients indi-
cate that poor accruals quality increase expected returns. The results for innate accruals quali-
ty are similar to that of total accruals quality, except that the risk premium implied by the av-
erage positive coefficient estimates appears actually larger. This suggests that the pricing ef-
fect of total accruals quality may be attributable to the innate components of accruals quality. 
The results on discretionary accruals quality are somewhat mixed, and the hypothesis that 
discretionary accruals are just noise in earnings cannot be rejected. 
KEYWORDS 
Earnings quality, accruals quality, information risk, cost of equity, expected returns, risk pre-
mium, asset-pricing 
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ON THE PRICING EFFECT OF EARNINGS QUALITY 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää raportoidun tuloksen laadun, informaatioriskin ja oman 
pääoman kustannuksen vuorovaikutusta. Tuloksen laatua mitataan tutkielmassa jaksotuserien 
kokonaislaadulla, joka on numeerinen mittari perustuen yrityksen jaksotusten estimointivir-
heeseen. Jaksotuserien kokonaislaatu jaetaan edelleen luontaiseen jaksotusten laatuun ja har-
kinnanvaraiseen jaksotusten laatuun, jotta voidaan tutkia näiden tekijöiden vaikutusta oman 
pääoman kustannukseen erikseen. Tutkielma osallistuu käynnissä olevaan keskusteluun siitä 
onko yrityskohtainen informaatioriski hinnoiteltu riskitekijä, ja mikä on se mekanismi jonka 
kautta informaatioriski vaikuttaa oman pääoman tuottovaatimukseen.  
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Tutkielmassa käytetään laajaa Yhdysvaltain markkinoilta kerättyä lähdeaineistoa aikavälillä 
1970–2006. Tuloksen laatumittarit perustuvat tilinpäätöstietoihin, jotka ovat haettu Compus-
tat North America Annual tietokannasta. Näiden mittareiden perusteella muodostetaan portfo-
lioita, joiden tuotot kuvaavat tietyn yrityksen alttiutta kyseiselle riskitekijälle. Kuukausitason 
tuottodata on haettu CRSP Monthly Stock- ja wrds tietokannoista. Tutkielmassa käytetään 
hinnoitteluteoria-metodologiaa selvittämään jaksotusten kokonaislaadun, luontaisen laadun ja 
harkinnanvaraisen laadun vaikutusta oman pääoman tuottovaatimukseen. 
TULOKSET 
Tulokset tuottavat systemaattista evidenssiä siitä että jaksotuserien kokonaislaatu on hinnoi-
teltu riskitekijä. Päätulokset perustuvat kaksivaiheiseen regressioanalyysiin, mutta nämä tu-
lokset eivät ota kantaa riskitekijään liittyvän riskipreemion suuruuteen. Keskimääräisesti posi-
tiiviset regressiokertoimet kuitenkin osoittavat, että huono jaksotusten kokonaislaatu kasvat-
taa tuottovaatimusta. Tulokset luontaisen jaksotusten laadun hinnoitteluvaikutuksista ovat 
samansuuntaisia kuin jaksotusten kokonaislaadun, paitsi että riskipreemio vaikuttaa olevan it-
se asiassa suurempi kuin jaksotusten kokonaislaadulla. Nämä tulokset antavat ymmärtää että 
jaksotusten kokonaislaatuun liittyvät hinnoitteluvaikutukset liittyvät jaksotusten kokonaislaa-
dun luontaisiin komponentteihin. Harkinnanvaraiseen jaksotusten laatuun liittyvät tulokset 
ovat jokseenkin ristiriitaisia, eikä niiden perusteella pystytä toteamaan etteivätkö harkinnan-
varaiset jaksotukset olisi vain raportoituun tulokseen liittyviä estimointivirheitä. 
AVAINSANAT  
Tuloksen laatu, jaksotuserien laatu, informaatioriski, oman pääoman kustannus, tuottovaati-
mus, riskipreemio, hinnoitteluteoria 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
This thesis examines the effect of accounting earnings quality on equity cost of capital. The 
research question is motivated by the considerable interest among accounting researchers to-
ward the subject especially during the latter half of last decade. Quality as a descriptive char-
acteristic of earnings was popularized by Lev (1989), when he argued that returns correlate 
poorly with earnings because earnings may be of poor quality. The effect of disclosure level 
and quality on a firm’s cost of capital is also a matter of considerable interest and importance 
to both firms and investors. For example, it is often suggested that high-quality accounting 
standards reduce capital costs (e.g. Levitt 1998, the former chairman of the SEC). Conse-
quently, the link between the quality of accounting information and cost of capital is consid-
ered one of the most important current issues in finance and accounting literature. 
 
A major part of the academic debate on the interplay between financial reporting quality and 
cost of capital centers on the quality of accruals. This is because of the great importance of 
accruals in arriving at a summarized and most followed single measure of firm performance 
(accounting earnings). Indeed, as argued by Healy (1996), financial statements and account-
ing earnings in particular are the most important single source of information to investors. 
Rational investors rely on reliable information about firms in their security pricing decisions. 
In particular, accounting information has a central role in evaluating the performance of firms 
and eliminating information asymmetry. 
 
Cost of capital is the expected return required by the investors holding a firm’s securities, and 
it can be decomposed into risk-free return and a risk premium. In traditional asset-pricing the-
ory (e.g. Fama 1991), the position is widely taken that risk premiums are completely deter-
mined by exposure to systematic risk or more precisely, the product of betas and risk premi-
ums on the systematic risk factors. Idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risks are not priced because in 
large economies investors can eliminate them by forming diversified portfolios (see e.g. 
Hughes et al. 2007). The exclusion of the role of information is puzzling given the presumed 
importance of market efficiency in asset-pricing. It is thus reasonable to ask, as Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) put it: ”If information matters for the market, why then should it not also mat-
ter for the firms that are in it?”  
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However, there is a growing branch of analytical literature establishing a link between infor-
mation quality and cost of capital (e.g. Barry and Brown 1985; Merton 1986; Easley and 
O’Hara 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia 2005). While the theory still fails to reach a consensus on 
whether information risk is priced, the empirical research on the subject likewise provides 
mixed evidence. Particularly, Francis et al. (2005) first suggest a negative association between 
earnings quality and cost of capital. A few years later, Core et al. (2008) argue that analysis of 
Francis et al. (2005) do not in fact test the hypothesis that earnings quality is a priced risk fac-
tor, and show using a different test setup that earnings quality is not related to returns. More 
recently, it has been shown that negative cash flow shocks (Ogneva 2008), and low-priced 
returns (Kim and Qi 2010) distort the results obtained by Core et al. (2008), and controlling 
for these effects earnings quality enters significantly into the asset-pricing regressions. Thus, 
the challenge for accounting research still remains valid to demonstrate whether and how 
firms’ accounting information manifests in their cost of capital, despite the forces of diversifi-
cation. 
1.2 Research question and contribution 
The thesis fits into a line of research which broadly examines the effect of information quality 
on a firm’s cost of capital. More specifically, the thesis focuses on the quality of accounting 
earnings, which is depicted by employing a widely used accounting-based accruals quality 
metric (AQ) developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002). 
AQ tells investors about the mapping of accounting accruals into operating cash flows. Poor 
accruals quality deteriorates this mapping and therefore increases information risk. Francis et 
al. (2005) argue that cash flow is the primitive element that investors price, which must be the 
underlying assumption when identifying accruals quality as the measure of information risk 
associated with earnings. AQ metric is calculated as the five-year standard deviation of resid-
uals from yearly regressions of a firm’s total current accruals on its lead-, lag-, and current 
operating cash flow, PPE, and change in revenues. Since the AQ metric is an accounting-
based measure of earnings quality, it mostly reflects the information precision risk embedded 
in financial reporting.  
 
It is first examined whether firm-specific information risk is priced and should be included in 
asset-pricing models as an additional risk factor. I conduct a set of asset-pricing regressions 
where firm excess returns are regressed on the market excess return and the Fama and French 
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(1993) size and book-to-market factor returns augmented with a risk factor constructed on the 
AQ metric. Specifically, the AQ factor mimicking portfolio return is calculated as the return 
on a strategy buying the poorest accruals quality stocks and selling short the best accruals 
quality stocks.  
 
As noted in the earlier literature (e.g. Liu and Wysocki 2007; Chen et al. 2008), the AQ met-
ric is highly correlated with firm fundamentals –especially operating volatility. For this rea-
son, I separate the discretionary accruals quality component (DisAQ) from innate accruals 
quality (InnAQ) inspired by Dechow and Dichew (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). DisAQ is 
measured as the residual from yearly regressions of total AQ on firm size, ten-year standard 
deviation of operating cash flow and sales revenue, firm’s operating cycle measured in days, 
and the sum of negative earnings figures during the past ten fiscal years. InnAQ is the fitted 
value in these same regressions. I then calculate factor mimicking portfolio returns based on 
the monthly rank values of InnAQ and DisAQ, and conduct proper asset-pricing tests for the-
se return series in order to examine the potential different pricing effects associated with in-
nate accruals quality and discretionary accruals quality separately. The motivation here is that 
while DisAQ is not correlated with any of the innate factors, I assume it represents the “pure” 
information component embedded in total accruals quality. In this manner, I am able to make 
the distinction whether accruals quality truly captures the risk in a firm’s financial reporting 
environment, or whether AQ is just driven by characteristics associated with fundamental 
risk. 
 
I believe this thesis contributes to the literature on the relation of earnings quality and cost of 
capital in two important ways. First, it contributes to the recent debate on whether the quality 
of accounting information is associated with higher cost of equity capital. Second, it adds to 
the literature on the source of this potential pricing effect of earnings quality by considering 
two potential sources of this pricing effect, namely the effect attributable to the innate com-
ponents of earnings quality and the effect arising exclusively from managerial discretion. 
1.3 Research methods and data 
The methodology used in this thesis relies on asset-pricing regressions of firm-specific excess 
returns on the accruals quality risk factor returns controlled by the other known risk factors. 
Using factor returns instead of using AQ and its subcomponents as firm characteristics en-
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sures that the pricing effect does not disappear even if investors fully diversify their portfoli-
os. Motivated by the findings of Kim and Qi (2010) and following the procedure used by e.g. 
Jagadeesh and Titman (2001), I exclude returns on stocks with a price less than $5 for two 
adjacent months. 
 
The empirical tests in this thesis employ an extensive sample from the US market in the peri-
od of 1970–2006. The long sample period is chosen to satisfy the extensive data requirement 
imposed by the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality metric and to maximize the pow-
er of the asset-pricing tests. Compared to many of the empirical papers in this literature, I 
have the opportunity to use data also from and post the era of the massive accounting frauds 
of Enron and WorldCom. Arguably, the asset-pricing implications of earnings quality are 
more prominent in this period, and consequently choosing the testing period so may strength-
en the results found in this thesis compared to some of the papers previously written in this 
area. The years from 2007 onward have been excluded from this study because of the global 
financial crisis and its potential distorting implications in the asset-pricing environment. Ac-
counting data used to construct the metrics for accruals quality are collected from Compustat 
North America Fundamentals Annual file. Accounting data are matched with monthly returns 
data, which are retrieved from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly 
Stock file. Finally, the Fama and French (1993) factor returns, as well as market return and 
risk-free return items are gathered from the Factors_Monthly file from Wharton Research 
Data Services (wrds). 
1.4 Results 
The findings indicate that AQ is a significantly priced risk factor, and this pricing effect holds 
despite the forces of diversification. I employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-stage cross-
sectional regression approach, and find that the pricing effect of total AQ is robust to whether 
the factor loadings are estimated on individual firm level either using the whole-period betas 
or 60-month rolling betas, or on portfolio level using two alternative commonly used portfolio 
formation criteria. The regression results do not have implications on the magnitude of the 
proposed risk premium, but the descriptive analysis documents a mean annualized risk premi-
um for the AQ factor return (AQfactor) of about 2.0%.  
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Following prior literature (e.g. Francis et al. 2005), I further decompose the AQ metric into its 
innate and discretionary components in order to analyze their pricing effects separately. I 
form factor mimicking portfolios based on InnAQ and DisAQ, and find that the factor return 
on InnAQ (Innfactor) is significantly priced in the regressions, with its average coefficient 
estimates even larger than those for the AQfactor. The descriptive analysis provides con-
sistent evidence documenting a mean annualized risk premium for the innate accruals quality 
mimicking portfolio of over 2.6%. I interpret from these results that the pricing effect of total 
accruals quality may be mainly attributable to the innate factors, such as firm size and operat-
ing volatility. These results are also supported by the fact that the factor returns on total ac-
cruals quality and innate accruals quality are highly positively correlated. Finally, I find only 
weak and inconsistent evidence from the regressions that discretionary accruals quality is re-
lated to expected returns. In most of the regression specifications, this association is negative 
consistent with the descriptive analysis documenting an annualized average return recorded 
for the discretionary accruals quality mimicking portfolio (Disfactor) of about -0.9%. Howev-
er, the regression coefficients of the Disfactor range between 5 times and 70 times smaller 
than those for the Innfactor, implying economic significance close to zero, even though the 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant in some of the specifications considered.  
1.5 Structure of the study 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section two presents the theoretical 
framework and previous literature relating to the association between earnings quality and 
cost of capital. Hypotheses based on the previous literature are also developed in section two. 
In section three, the earnings quality proxies used in this thesis are constructed. The section 
also presents the data and the sample selection process. Section four discusses the implica-
tions of measuring cost of capital and constructs the risk factors representing the systematic 
components of the accruals quality metrics. In section five, the main empirical tests are con-
ducted, and the results are discussed in more detail in section six. Finally, section seven con-
cludes the study. 
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2 LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section begins by first describing the importance of reliable financial information and 
disclosure in the modern capital markets, as well as their implications to investors and to 
firms. Accounting is then described as a means to measure firm performance and mitigating 
the problems associated with information in the capital markets. Moving forward, key find-
ings from previous literature are presented to support the development of hypotheses. Finally, 
hypotheses are developed based on previous literature. 
2.1 The role of financial information and disclosure in capital markets 
2.1.1 Information problem and agency problem 
Managers of firms have incentives to provide useful information to capital markets in order to 
attract capital investments in their firms. With these invested funds, managers then finance the 
risky projects that the firms undertake in order to increase shareholder value. Investors on the 
other hand, are only willing to invest capital in the firm if the expected return from the in-
vestment matches the risk involved in that security. To assess the expected return and riski-
ness of potential investment targets, investors need information about the expected future cash 
flows and the risks associated with those cash flows.  
 
It is commonly acknowledged that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors (see 
e.g. Healy and Palepu 2001). Information and incentive problems impede the efficient alloca-
tion of resources in capital markets. Managers typically have better information than investors 
about the value of their business investment opportunities, and incentives to overstate the val-
ue of their venture. Investors therefore face an information problem when they make an in-
vestment in risky securities. Once investors have invested in the securities of certain firms, 
managers have an incentive to expropriate their savings, creating an agency problem (Healy 
and Palepu 2001).  
 
The information or “lemons“ problem of Akerlof (1970) arises from differences in infor-
mation and conflicting interests between buyers and sellers. In his esteemed paper, Akerlof 
(1970) uses an example from a used car market, in which half of the cars are good and half of 
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them are bad (lemons). Since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good 
car and a lemon, all cars must sell at the same price. Consequently, the seller of a good car 
cannot receive a fair price of the car he would otherwise be willing to sell. At the extreme, 
good cars may be driven out of the market by lemons, because no seller has incentive to sell 
at the price set by the market.  
 
The second problem that investors face when investing in risky securities is agency problem 
(see e.g. Jensen and Mecklin 1976). Agency problem arises from the separation of ownership 
(the principal) and control (the agent). If both parties to the relationship are utility maximiz-
ers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of the 
principal. Investors do not typically play an active role in the firm they have invested their 
money in, but rather that role is delegated to a professional manager. Once investors have 
invested their funds in the firm, the self-interested manager may have incentives to make de-
cisions that expropriate the investors’ funds. For example, the manager may pay excessive 
compensation or make investment decisions that are harmful for investors, while benefit the 
manager himself.  
 
As suggested by Healy and Palepu (2001), there are several solutions both to the information 
problem and the agency problem. First, optimal contracts1 between shareholders and manag-
ers may be successful in aligning the interests of the two parties. These are commonly negoti-
ated by the Board of Directors, who acts as a representative of the shareholders. Another 
mechanism for reducing information and agency problems are independent auditors, who 
have a central role in verifying the correctness of the reported numbers disclosed to capital 
markets. Finally, information intermediaries and financial intermediaries have an important 
role in information production and monitoring of the management.  
2.1.2 Earnings as a measure of firm performance 
Notwithstanding the importance of the above mentioned mechanisms in reducing information 
problems and agency problems, financial statements and accounting earnings in particular, are 
the most important single source of information to investors (Healy 1996). Accrual earnings 
are considered to be a superior measure of firm performance than cash flows because they 
                                                 
1 As an example of the contracting between shareholders and the manager, one could mention a compensation 
package designed so that the manager will benefit from acting in the interest of shareholders, i.e. increasing the 
value of the firm. 
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mitigate the timing and mismatching problems inherent in measuring cash flows over short 
intervals (Dechow 1994). However, despite being heavily regulated and to a large extent har-
monized around the world, financial reporting standards allow flexibility in reporting of sev-
eral items affecting earnings, meaning that accrual accounting is always subject to managerial 
discretion. Managers use discretion for a wide range of reasons, including to increase their 
own compensation and to protect their job security, to communicate their expectations of 
long-term firm performance with investors, and to create stockholder wealth at the expense of 
other stakeholders such as debt holders, taxpayers, and regulatory bodies (Healy 1996). 
 
Managerial discretion could enhance earnings’ informativeness by allowing communication 
of private information which makes earnings a tool for signaling the value of a firm, thus en-
hancing the value of accounting as a language for communicating with investors. As manag-
ers typically possess superior information compared to financial markets concerning their 
own firms, accrual accounting is plausibly desirable from investors’ point of view. On the 
other hand, misalignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests could induce managers to 
use the flexibility provided by financial reporting standards to manage income opportunisti-
cally, thereby creating distortions in the reported earnings (Healy and Palepu 1993). 
 
Accounting-based earnings rely on the assumption that the function of earnings is the effec-
tive allocation of cash flows to reporting periods via the accruals process. Accruals shift or 
adjust the recognition of cash flows over time, so that the adjusted number (earnings) better 
measures firm performance. For example, recording a receivable accelerates the recognition 
of a future cash flow into earnings, and matches the timing of the accounting recognition with 
the timing of the economic benefits from the sale. In this manner, accruals enable accounting 
earnings to more accurately represent the economic implications of underlying transactions 
and events. However, accruals are frequently based on assumptions and estimates that, if 
wrong, must be corrected in future accruals and earnings. For example, if the net proceeds 
from a receivable are less than the original estimate, then the subsequent entry records both 
the cash collected and the correction of the estimation error arising from false assumptions or 
estimates (Dechow and Dichev 2002).  
 
Firms, whose accruals are of poor quality, have a large proportion of their total accruals that is 
unrelated to cash flow realizations. Consequently, they have more noise and less persistence 
in their earnings. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that estimation errors and their subsequent 
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corrections are noise that reduces the beneficial nature of accruals. Therefore, the quality of 
accruals and earnings is decreasing in the magnitude of accruals estimation errors. This is 
why earnings quality is often defined in terms of the relation between accruals and cash flows 
(McNichols 2002). 
 
Economic and structural factors can cause variation in the precision of accruals estimates, 
regardless of the presence or absence of questionable managerial motives in the reporting pro-
cess. This variation can take form across different accounts of a given firm, for a given firm 
over time, and across firms. Furthermore, managerial expertise will affect the precision of 
estimates. As a result, less than perfect mapping between accruals and cash flows in adjacent 
periods can reflect firms that report honestly but face uncertain economic environment, firms 
whose managers are less expert at estimation, and or firms whose managers intervene in the 
process to manipulate accruals (McNichols 2002).  
2.2 Theoretical background for the link between information risk and cost of capital 
Investors rely on reliable information about firms to rationally price their securities as a result 
of supply and demand in the marketplace. The prices adjust so that they reflect the expected 
future cash flows generated by the security, discounted to the present moment by the cost of 
capital. In other words, the security prices adjust so that the expected returns equal the risk-
adjusted cost of capital, which can be decomposed into risk-free rate and the risk premium. It 
seems intuitively appealing that since information is critical for investors, they would penalize 
firms for providing information which is of poor quality. In neoclassical finance theory how-
ever, it is widely held that risk premiums are completely determined by exposure to systemat-
ic risk or, more precisely, the product of betas and risk premiums on systematic risk factors. 
So even with diversified portfolios, investors must keep market risk in their portfolios and 
they are compensated with greater expected returns for holding it. But no one must hold idio-
syncratic risk, so there is no market compensation for doing so (Easley et al. 2002). As infor-
mation risk is not perceived to be a systematic risk factor, the quality of accounting earnings 
should not have any effect on expected returns. Instead, according to this theory information 
risk and other firm-specific risks are seen as idiosyncratic, meaning that in economies with 
multiple securities they can be diversified away. 
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As opposed to neoclassical finance theory, there is a growing branch of literature suggesting 
that there is a role for various information determinants in determining the expected rate of 
return. These analytical papers arise from incomplete information, estimation risk, and market 
microstructure literatures. The theoretical models differ from each other to a great extent both 
in terms of whether they suggest that information risk can be diversified, and if it cannot, 
what is the source of this risk. The common ground for all of these literatures is that they ex-
ploit the idea that the assumption of mean-variance matrix of asset payoffs adopted in neo-
classical asset-pricing theories (such as the CAPM) may not hold. This enables that investors 
will be differentially informed about the asset payoffs, leading to a cost of capital effect if 
markets are not efficient and diversification in the economy is incomplete. While the literature 
seems to lack a consensus about the extent to which securities markets are efficient, some 
papers argue that information risk premium exists even if the assumption of inefficient mar-
kets is relaxed. This literature argues that a premium on information risk represents a rational 
investor response by an efficient market to the existence of the causing effect of that risk (e.g. 
Amihud and Mendelson 1986).  
  
To the best of my knowledge, the equilibrium model of Barry and Brown (1985) was the first 
analytical model to suggest that the relative quantity of information may introduce cross-
sectional differences in systematic risk. The model demonstrates that securities for which 
there is less information have relatively higher systematic risk. Barry and Brown (1985) fur-
ther show that differences in information lead to required return predictions that differ across 
securities, so that expected returns become commensurate with the additional risk introduced 
by relatively poorer information. Another traditional paper by Merton (1987) is based on a 
setting where investors generally agree on the return distribution of securities but information 
is incomplete in a sense that not all investors are aware of the existence of certain assets. Mer-
ton (1987) assumes that investors incur a cost of becoming aware of a particular firm, and 
because for existing shareholders this cost is sunk, it is beneficial for investors to follow only 
a subset of firms. He shows that in equilibrium the value of a firm is always lower when there 
is incomplete information, and the smaller the investor base, the larger the difference between 
the firm’s current market value and its optimal market value.  
 
Epstein and Schneider (2008) also develop an incomplete information equilibrium model, in 
which uncertain information affects asset prices in the cross-section. Epstein and Schneider 
(2008) however, show that investors require compensation for low future information quality, 
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and if the signal about future information quality is ambiguous, then the information risk be-
comes systematic. Further, they maintain that investors require more compensation for low 
information quality when fundamentals are more volatile.  
 
In Easley and O’Hara’s (2004) model, information risk is shown to arise from information 
asymmetry between the informed and the uninformed investors. Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
show that private information increases the risk to uninformed investors of holding the stock 
because the informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio weights to incorporate 
new information. Private information thus induces a form of risk which the uninformed inves-
tors cannot diversify, and in equilibrium they require compensation for bearing this risk, caus-
ing cross-sectional differences in firms’ required returns. In addition, Easley and O’Hara 
(2004) maintain that required returns are affected by the precision of both public and private 
information, with less precise information leading to higher required returns2.  
 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) take a different approach by examining the effects of illiquidi-
ty on asset-pricing. They develop a market microstructure model predicting that expected as-
set returns are increasing in the relative bid-ask spread and the spread effect has explanatory 
power over and above the market and size effects on expected returns. This is based on the 
idea that investors maximize expected returns net of transaction costs and in equilibrium re-
quire a premium for holding lower liquidity stocks. Their model suggests that to affect cost of 
capital, firms can engage in financial policies which increase liquidity and lead to reduced 
bid-ask spreads.  
 
Another often cited paper is Leuz and Verrecchia (2005), which argues that poor information 
quality leads to misaligned capital investments, which rational investors are able to price by 
discounting firms’ expected cash flows at a higher rate of return. Higher quality information 
on the other hand, improves the coordination between firms and investors with respect to cap-
ital investment decisions. This effect results in an increase in expected cash flows without a 
commensurate increase in the firm’s covariance with the market, which has a negative effect 
                                                 
2 On the contrary, Hughes et al. (2007) argue that the pricing effect suggested in Easley and O’Hara (2004) is 
driven by under-diversification in finite economies considered by Easley and O’Hara (2004), and will disappear 
when the economy becomes large. Their equilibrium model suggests that holding total information constant, 
private information affects market-wide factor risk premiums, but doesn’t influence individual firm betas, thus 
leading to no cross-sectional differences in expected returns. As a result, after the known betas are controlled for, 
Hughes et al. (2007) argue that there is no cross-sectional relation between expected returns and the degree of 
information asymmetry.   
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on firm’s cost of capital, even if information quality is uncorrelated across firms. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2005) show that even in an economy with many firms and a systematic compo-
nent to the pay-off from investment, a portion of this risk is non-diversifiable.  
 
The previously discussed theoretical models rely on financial information determinants that 
are either described in general terms, or alternatively derived from the capital markets such as 
the bid-ask spreads and volatility. However, two analytical papers establishing a connection 
between information quality and cost of capital are specifically based on the quality on ac-
counting information. These are Yee (2006) and Lambert et al. (2007), both of which are 
based on a setting in which investors rely on noisy reported earnings for information about 
risky firms. Yee (2006) argues that earnings quality risk magnifies fundamental risk, leading 
to higher cost of capital. Further, increasing fundamental risk magnifies the influence of earn-
ings quality risk on the cost of capital, but at the extreme in the complete absence of funda-
mental risk, earnings quality risk is unrelated to expected returns because the underlying busi-
ness contains no risk to begin with. Moreover, Yee (2006) maintains that only the systematic 
portion of earnings quality risk affects expected returns, while nonsystematic risk can be 
completely diversified away. On the other hand, Lambert et al. (2007) show that the quality of 
accounting information influences a firm’s cost of capital both directly by affecting investors’ 
perceptions about the covariance of a firm’s future cash flows with those of the market, and 
indirectly by affecting real decisions influencing the distributions of those future cash flows. 
Consistent with Yee (2006), Lambert et al. (2007) suggest that this effect cannot be diversi-
fied even if the number of securities in the economy becomes large. Nevertheless, Lambert et 
al. (2007) argue that the pricing effects can be fully captured by appropriately specified for-
ward-looking beta, suggesting that the effect of earnings quality on cost of capital occurs in 
empirical tests because earnings quality is one component of the unobservable forward-
looking beta. 
 
Taken together, the evidence from the analytical models drawn from incomplete information, 
estimation risk, and market microstructure literatures suggest that information quality is a 
determinant of cost of capital, and that risk factor cannot be diversified even in large econo-
mies. The principal implication based on these papers is that securities for which there is rela-
tively little information available or that information is of poor quality, will have higher ex-
pected returns than will otherwise identical securities. However, some of the analytical mod-
els do not attribute information risk a role in determining expected returns in the cross-
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section, which is also consistent with the traditional asset-pricing literature. Moreover, alt-
hough most of the theoretical models do established a link between information risk and cost 
of capital, they differ greatly from each other in terms of what is the source of this infor-
mation risk, thus leaving room for further examination. 
2.3 Prior empirical research on accounting quality and cost of capital 
Several recent empirical studies suggest a negative association between different information 
quality metrics and cost of capital, where cost of capital is the discount factor of a firm’s fu-
ture cash flows (see e.g. Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2005; Aboody et al. 
2005; Ecker et al. 2006; Ogneva 2008; Kim and Qi 2010). This line of research generally 
builds on the above presented theoretical connection between information quality and cost of 
capital, and assumes that this connection does not disappear even if investors diversify their 
portfolios. 
 
Botosan (1997) examines the relationship between disclosure level and cost of equity capital 
by regressing firm-specific estimates of cost of equity on market beta, firm-size and a self-
constructed measure of disclosure level based on the amount of voluntary disclosure provided 
in annual reports. She finds a negative significant relationship between her measure of disclo-
sure level and implied cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst following, but fails to 
find evidence of such relationship for firms followed by many analysts. Botosan (1997) con-
cludes that this may be due to the fact that her disclosure measure is limited to annual report 
information and accordingly may not provide a powerful proxy for a firm’s overall disclosure 
level when analysts play a significant role in the information production process. To tackle 
this problem, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) extend the analysis of Botosan (1997) by studying 
the association between the implied cost of equity capital and three different types of disclo-
sure, namely annual report, quarterly and other published reports, and investor relations. They 
use disclosure ratings based on the Association for Investment Management and Research’s 
(AIMR) Annual Reviews of Corporate Disclosure Practices scores. Botosan and Plumlee 
(2002) find no evidence of the total disclosure score being related to cost of capital, but they 
do find that the cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure, and contrary to 
the theory, increases in the level of timely disclosure. Finally, the authors do not find evidence 
of association between the cost of capital and the level of investor relations activities. Botosan 
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and Plumlee’s (2002) result suggest that type of disclosure is critical in determining the link 
between disclosure and the cost of capital. 
 
Similarly, Francis et al. (2004) study the relation between implied cost of equity capital and 
seven attributes of earnings, namely accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, 
value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. Out of the proposed earnings attributes, they 
find that the largest cost of equity effects are measured for accruals quality. Francis et al.’s 
(2004) findings are robust to controls for innate determinants of the earnings attributes3, as 
well as to alternative proxies for the cost of equity capital.    
 
Arguably the most influential paper in the earnings quality and cost of capital literature is 
Francis et al. (2005), which suggests based on their time series regressions of contemporane-
ous stock returns, that firms with low accruals quality have higher cost of capital than do 
firms with high accruals quality. Based on these results Francis et al. (2005) conclude that 
information risk as proxied by AQ is a priced risk factor. More specifically, they measure 
significant positive coefficient estimates for the AQ factor mimicking portfolio from one- and 
three-factor asset-pricing regressions, and find that adding the AQ factor into asset-pricing 
models contributes significant incremental explanatory power over the other proposed risk 
factors. Based on these results, Francis et al. (2005) argue that an asset-pricing model without 
an information quality factor is not fully specified. Finally, they distinguish among possible 
sources of information risk and find that both innate accruals quality and discretionary accru-
als quality have a positive effect on the cost of capital, while the effect of innate accruals 
quality is larger and more significant than the effect of discretionary accruals quality.   
 
Aboody et al. (2005) examine whether privately informed traders can earn greater profits by 
trading stocks with higher exposure to the asymmetric information risk factor. They use four 
alternative accruals-based earnings quality metrics to identify firms for which privately in-
formed trading is likely to be more pronounced, and hence, subject uninformed traders to 
greater asymmetric information risk4. Studying the Jensen’s alphas on regressions of earnings 
quality hedge portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) risk factor returns, Aboody et 
al. (2005) document alpha estimates ranging between 0.99% and 1.18% per month depending 
                                                 
3 Francis et al. (2004) consider firm size, cash flow and sales volatility, incidence of loss operating cycle, intan-
gibles use, and capital intensity as the relevant innate determinants of earnings attributes. 
4Aboody et al. (2005) measure insider trading profits from the date of the trade to one day after filing reports of 
those trades to the SEC. 
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on the earnings quality metric, suggesting an economically strong pricing effect. However, as 
these estimates are weak in terms of statistical significance, Aboody et al. (2005) also conduct 
supporting analysis and find that the highest quintile portfolios earn significant abnormal re-
turns whereas the other quintile portfolios do not. 
 
Core et al. (2008) argue that the time series regressions by Francis et al. (2005) do not specifi-
cally test the hypothesis that AQ is a priced risk factor. Rather, they suggest that the average 
positive coefficient only indicates that on average, the firms in the time series regressions 
have positive exposure to the AQfactor. Consequently, employing two-stage cross-sectional 
regression technique, Core et al. (2008) examine whether accruals quality is associated with 
future realized returns and find that although positive on average, accruals quality is not sta-
tistically significant. They also find similar results from the regressions where earnings quali-
ty is proxied by the decile rank of Dechow and Dichev (2002) AQ metric. Finally, Core et al. 
(2008) conduct a time series asset-pricing test in order to examine whether an accruals quality 
factor mimicking portfolio strategy earns positive abnormal returns, and find that the hedge 
portfolio strategy earns significant positive excess returns in the 1985í2003 sub-period (simi-
lar to the one employed by Aboody et al. (2005)), but not in their full sample period of 
1971í2003.  
 
Ogneva (2008) argues that Core et al. (2008) were unable to find an association between ac-
cruals quality and realized returns because they apply a measure of accruals quality that is 
negatively correlated with feature cash flow shocks. She maintains that poor accruals quality 
firms experience negative cash flow shocks in the future, which result in negative returns that 
offset the higher expected returns for such firms, thereby leading to no association between 
accruals quality and future realized returns. Consistent with her hypothesis, Ogneva (2008) 
finds a significant negative association between realized returns and accruals quality after 
controlling for these adverse cash flow shocks, either by including proxies for future cash 
flow shocks as control variables in her cross-sectional asset-pricing regressions or by using an 
accruals quality metric that is less correlated with characteristics likely associated with these 
future cash flow shocks. Similarly, Kim and Qi (2010) find evidence that AQfactor is signifi-
cantly priced after controlling for low-priced stocks in similar regressions as conducted by 
Core et al. (2008). Kim and Qi (2010) argue that the results of Core et al. (2008) are mostly 
driven by low-priced returns that are biased due to unsystematic factors such as noise trading, 
sentiment trading, and market-microstructure induced effects. Consequently, in their two-
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stage cross-sectional regression tests, they assign a dummy variable for returns of stocks 
priced less than $5. Furthermore, Kim and Qi (2010) show that AQ and its pricing effects are 
related to firms’ fundamental risk. They find that the innate component of AQ risk premium 
reacts systematically to business cycles and macroeconomic conditions, whereas the discre-
tionary component is independent of these conditions. In addition, they find consistent with 
Ogneva (2008) that firms with poorer AQ are more exposed to macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Probably largely attributable to the size of the market and superior data availability, almost 
every empirical paper on earnings quality and cost of capital uses data drawn from the US 
market. One exception is the paper of Gray et al. (2009), which conducts among other things, 
both time series asset-pricing regressions, as well as two-stage cross-sectional regressions 
using Australian data in 1998-2006. The authors suggest that there are a number of institu-
tional and regulatory differences compared to the US, which are hypothesized to affect the 
relation between accruals quality and cost of capital. The results of Gray et al. (2009) suggest 
that total accruals quality is priced by the Australian equity market, independent on the test 
methodology. These findings contradict the results of Core et al. (2008) and highlight the im-
portance of the institutional setting in earnings quality’s effect on cost of capital. When Gray 
et al. (2009) partition total AQ is into innate and discretionary AQ components similarly to 
Francis et al. (2005), only innate AQfactor returns appears to have an influence on cost of 
equity. The authors conjecture, that this is because there is little room for discretion by Aus-
tralian managers in financial reporting, mainly because of the relative importance of private 
creditors in Australian market who typically have better access to the financial and business 
information of the borrowing firm and are thus more likely to perform a monitoring role 
through their close relation with borrowing firms, thereby mitigating managerial opportunism. 
 
Measures of earnings quality based on accounting data are typically estimated either using a 
firm-specific time series of annual data or industry cross-sections. Both approaches place sig-
nificant restrictions on sample size, and especially in the case of time series specifications 
where the required time series are longest, biases the sample towards surviving firms. To mit-
igate this problem, Ecker et al. (2006) develop an earnings quality metric (e-loading), that is 
based on daily returns in constructing the AQfactor mimicking portfolio, as opposed to the 
monthly returns used by Francis et al. (2005). Their measure is the slope coefficient from a 
regression of a firm’s daily excess returns on a factor mimicking portfolio capturing earnings 
quality. Although using daily returns is known to introduce additional noise into returns re-
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gressions, Ecker et al. (2006) show that reliable estimates of e-loadings can be estimated for 
periods as short as a quarter. Their findings imply that e-loadings are significantly associated 
with realized returns. However, the results have no implications for the magnitudes of the 
pricing effects.  
 
As most of the previous empirical literature on earnings quality and cost of capital uses long 
time series without trying to separate any specific subsets of firms, there is also a branch of 
literature trying to establish whether the pricing effect of earnings quality changes around 
specific events. One of these studies is Kravet and Shevlin (2010), who examine whether the 
pricing of discretionary information risk as measures by discretionary accruals quality in-
creases after accounting restatements. Supported by the stream of theoretical research show-
ing that firm-specific information is non-diversifiable, they expect that the discretionary com-
ponent of a firm’s information risk increases after the announcement of a restatement. They 
examine a period of three years before and after restatement announcements and a find a sta-
tistically significant increase in the factor loading on discretionary information risk equivalent 
to an annualized 86 basis points. That increase in the cost of capital however, is found decline 
back to the pre-statement level over the 36 month post-restatement period. Chen et al. (2007) 
on the other hand, examine using a large sample of dividend-change events whether the pric-
ing effect of earnings quality changes around a dividend change setting. Based on the earlier 
literature showing that dividend changes are associated with systematic risks as evidenced by 
changes in the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model loadings, Chen et al. (2007) expect 
these dividend changes to lead to changes in the precision of the firm’s earnings information, 
and thus affect market participants’ perception of these firms’ information risk. Augmenting 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with information risk factor returns, Chen et 
al. (2007) find that dividend initiation and dividend increase firms exhibit a decrease on the 
information risk factor loadings suggesting a decrease in the pricing of information risk for 
these firms, while dividend decrease firms exhibit an increase in the corresponding factor 
loadings, suggesting an opposite pricing effect change. The results hold even when controlled 
for operating risk, and using an alternative measure of information risk. However, even 
though the changes in factor loadings are statistically significant for dividend initiation and 
dividend decrease firms, the economic significance of the annualized risk premiums ranging 
between -0.53% and 0.56% seem very low. 
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Taken together, the findings of prior empirical research suggest almost unexceptionally that 
the quality of accounting information is negatively associated with cost of capital. Based on 
this literature, I state my first hypothesis as: 
 
H1. Total accruals quality is negatively associated with equity cost of capital, i.e. total 
accruals quality is priced in the cross-section of firms. 
2.4 Prior research on discretionary accruals and the effect of fundamental risk 
Liu and Wysocki (2007) examine whether accruals quality is associated with several account-
ing-based cost of capital measures after controlling for operating volatility5. They find that 
without controlling for operating volatility, all the cost of capital measures under review are 
significantly related to accruals quality. On the contrary, once they include operating volatility 
variables in the cost of capital regressions, they document that accruals quality displays either 
insignificant or inconsistent associations with various cost of capital measures. They further 
partition a sub-sample of firms in which accruals quality exhibit only small correlation with 
operating volatility. Using this sub-sample, they find that accruals quality is significantly 
positively related to industry-adjusted E/P ratio, but enters insignificantly into regressions 
where the dependent variable is either cost of debt or the CAPM beta. In these same regres-
sions, the operating volatility variables display strong and robust associations with all of the 
cost of capital metrics tested. Based on these results, Liu and Wysocki (2007) conclude that 
operating volatility is the primary driver of the association between accruals quality and cost 
of capital, but yet suggest that although highly correlated, these two empirical variables cap-
ture different underlying constructs and affect a firm’s cost of capital in different ways. 
 
Chen et al. (2008) on the other hand, examine the interaction of accruals quality and funda-
mental risk in affecting expected returns. Motivated by the theoretical model of Yee (2006), 
Chen et al. (2008) expect that accruals quality has a negative effect on cost of capital, and that 
the effect increases with fundamental risk. In their tests based on factor loadings in regres-
sions of realized returns on different risk factor returns, they find that the accruals quality 
pricing effect differs across firms based on their levels of fundamental risk. Specifically, by 
dividing firms into sub-samples based on their measure of composite fundamental risk con-
                                                 
5 Liu and Wysocki (2007) measure operating volatility as the five-year standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations. 
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sisting of four fundamental risk variables, they find essentially no relation between accruals 
quality and cost of capital for firms with the lowest fundamental risk. On the contrary, they 
find a strong relationship between realized returns and accruals quality for firms with the 
highest fundamental risk. They further find using E/P ratio as a proxy for cost of capital, that 
an interaction term involving accruals quality and the composite fundamental risk measure is 
significantly related to cost of capital, and that the pricing effect may be mainly attributed to 
that interaction term. This is consistent with AQ pricing effect being related to fundamental 
risk. 
 
Subramanyam (1996) examines the stock market pricing of discretionary accruals on a large 
sample of firms in 1973-93, and finds that on average, the market attaches value to discretion-
ary accruals. His analysis is based on the explanatory power and coefficient estimates in re-
gressions of annual realized returns on different measures of firm performance. He documents 
that when firm performance is measured by either net income or nondiscretionary income6, 
both the coefficient estimates and the explanatory power are higher as compared to when per-
formance is measured by operating cash flow. These results are consistent with Dechow 
(1994) who concludes that the market attaches value to total accruals. Subramanyam (1996) 
further finds that earnings perform better in explaining returns than nondiscretionary income, 
and interprets from these results that a significant part of the improvement is attributable to 
the discretionary component of accruals. Subramanyam (1996) further performs a set of tests 
to point out the source of the discovered pricing effect of discretionary accruals. He finds evi-
dence of managers either improving the value relevance of earnings by smoothing income7, or 
by communicating private information about future profitability not reflected in historical cost 
accounting. 
 
Using a similar research design, Guay et al. (1996) specify a simple earnings model to evalu-
ate five different discretionary accruals models. They suggest that discretionary accruals can 
be divided in up to three subcomponents, namely performance measurement-, opportunism-, 
and noise components. Under the performance measurement hypothesis, discretionary accru-
als help managers to produce a reliable and more timely measure of firm performance, i.e. 
                                                 
6 Nondiscretionary income is the part of income that has not been subject to any managerial discretion (e.g. 
Subramanyam 1996). 
7 It is important to note that while income smoothing often has an opportunistic connotation, not all smoothing is 
necessarily opportunistic. Rather, managers may use smoothing to e.g. counteract the effects of transitory 
movements in profitability, thus improving reporting usefulness.  
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earnings, than using nondiscretionary accruals alone. The opportunistic accrual management 
hypothesis is that discretionary accruals are employed to hide poor performance or to post-
pone a portion of unusually good current earnings to future years. Finally, discretionary ac-
cruals hypothesis states that discretionary accruals are only noise in earnings. Guay et al. 
(1996) find that only two discretionary accrual models, that is, the Jones (1991) and the Jones 
model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) decompose total accruals into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components so that the results are distinguishable from those obtained by 
randomly decomposed accruals components, suggesting that the discretionary accruals mod-
els generally measure discretionary accruals with considerable error. More importantly how-
ever, they find evidence of these two models producing discretionary accruals that are con-
sistent with both performance improving and opportunistic smoothing of earnings hypotheses, 
but caveat in discriminating between these two.  
 
Taken together, the results reported in Subramanyam (1996) and Guay et al. (1996) are incon-
sistent with pervasive accruals manipulation that distorts reported earnings. While they both 
find evidence of income smoothing, the smoothing appears to improve rather than diminish 
the value relevance of reported earnings. Moreover, Guay et al. (1996) argue based on the fact 
that managerial discretion over accruals has survived for centuries, that the net effect of dis-
cretionary accruals in the population is to enhance earnings as a performance measure. How-
ever, it seems that separating these distinct effect is indeed challenging, and consequently 
Healy (1996) argues that while both performance measurement and opportunistic behavior 
may occur in a cross-section of firms and within the same firm over time, the observed rela-
tion between these separate effects and stock returns will be a weighted average of these sepa-
rate effects. Although the studies on the market pricing of discretionary accruals are in general 
silent on the economic magnitude of the perceived pricing effects, DeFond and Park (2001) 
find studying the earnings response coefficients (ERC) around the disclosure of quarterly re-
ports that abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of market reactions to earnings surprises, 
suggesting that investors do not find them as reliable as normal accrual components. 
 
Overall, the combined findings of Liu and Wysocki (2007) and Chen et al. (2008) suggest that 
the pricing effects of accruals quality are intertwined with the pricing effects of fundamental 
risk. I have thus good grounds to expect that a firm’s innate factors are the ultimate driving 
force of the pricing effect of total accruals quality. Moreover, Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
argue that in markets in which fundamentals do not move much to begin with, investors do 
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not care whether information quality is good or bad so that the corresponding risk premium 
should be small nonetheless. For these reasons, I expect innate accruals quality to be negative-
ly associated with equity cost of capital. While the net effect of the three subcomponents of 
discretionary AQ is uncertain, I have no ex ante expectation about the influence of discretion-
ary accruals quality on the cost of equity. That being said, I predict that innate accruals quality 
and discretionary accruals quality have different effects on expected returns in the cross-
section of firms, and that effect is smaller for discretionary accruals quality in economic 
terms. This leads to my second hypothesis, which is divided into two parts: 
 
H2. a) Accruals quality attributable to innate components is negatively associated with 
equity cost of capital. 
 
H2. b) The pricing effect of discretionary accruals quality differs from the pricing effect 
of innate accruals quality and is smaller in economic terms.  
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3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DATA 
This section discusses the implications relating to the measurement of earnings quality and 
then builds the chosen proxy (AQ) used in this thesis. Further, the AQ metric is decomposed 
into two other earnings quality metrics, namely innate accruals quality (InnAQ) and discre-
tionary accruals quality (DisAQ). Finally, data and the sample selection process are presented. 
3.1 Development of AQ 
Since the objective of this study is to examine whether earnings quality is priced in the capital 
markets, the fundamental part of this task is to build a metric which is able to capture the 
quality in a firm’s reported earnings. The challenge, naturally lies in the fact that quality as 
such is an intangible subject and cannot be readily observed or measured. Consequently, first 
capturing the quality of accounting earnings, and second partitioning accruals into discretion-
ary and nondiscretionary components is not without a question. Measurement error is of par-
ticular concern in this thesis because it not only introduces noise but may also be an alterna-
tive explanation of the results. Although there is no commonly agreed-upon earnings quality 
construct, it seems that the accruals quality metric (AQ) originally developed by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002) has gained most popularity in the empiri-
cal earnings quality literature (e.g. Francis et al. 2004, 2005; Aboody et al. 2005; Ecker et al. 
2006; Core et al. 2008; Ogneva 2008; Kim and Qi 2010; Kravet and Shevlin 2010). While the 
literature knows multiple alternative proxies for the quality of accounting information, the 
accruals quality metric of Dechow and Dichev (2002) is both theoretically appealing and does 
not rely on stock market variables in measuring earnings quality, thus ensuring that possible 
implied associations between earnings quality and realized returns do not arise merely as a 
result of a mechanical connection between the dependent and the independent variables. In 
addition, Francis et al. (2004) report that AQ has larger effects on cost of capital than several 
other earnings attributes8. For an excellent review on various alternative earnings quality met-
rics, see Dechow et al. (2010). 
 
Using its popularity in the existing literature as a tie-breaker, I apply the McNichols (2002) 
modification of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) AQ construct to depict earnings quality in this 
                                                 
8 Specifically, Francis et al. (2004) document that AQ dominates the cost of capital effects of earnings persis-
tence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism, and that earnings variability has 
about the same effects as AQ. 
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thesis. AQ tells investors about the extent to which working capital accruals map into operat-
ing past, present, and future cash flow realizations. AQ is measured as the five-year standard 
deviation of firm-specific residuals (İit) over the years t - 4 through t from Equation (1), which 
is estimated annually for each of the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classes with at least 
20 observations in year t. Thus, AQit = ı(İi)t, where subscript i denotes individual firm and 
subscript t denotes the year of the estimation. Greater (smaller) value of AQ signifies poorer 
(better) earnings quality, because larger standard deviation of these residuals implies potential 
inconsistencies in a firm’s accounting and financial reporting system. The model from which 
AQ is estimated is as follows: 
 
 ܶܥܣ௜௧ = Ԅ଴௜ + Ԅଵ௜ܥܨ ௜ܱ௧ିଵ + Ԅଶ௜ܥܨ ௜ܱ௧ + Ԅଷ௜ܥܨ ௜ܱ௧ାଵ + Ԅସ௜߂ܴ݁ݒ௜௧+ Ԅହ௜ܲܲܧ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ (1) 
  
where:  
 
TCAit = ǻCAit - ǻCLit - ǻCashit + ǻSTDEBTit is the total current accruals in year t, 
ǻCAit is the change in current assets between years t - 1 and t, 
ǻCLit is the change in current liabilities between years t - 1 and t, 
ǻCashit is the change in cash and short-term investments between years t - 1 and t,  
ǻSTDEBTit is the change in debt in current liabilities between years t - 1 and t,  
CFOit = NIBEit - TAit is the cash flow from operations in year t, 
NIBEit is the net income before extraordinary items in year t, 
TAit = ǻCAit - ǻCLit - ǻCashit + ǻSTDEBTit - DEPNit is the total accruals in year t, 
DEPNit is the depreciation and amortization expense in year t,  
ǻRevit is the change in revenue between years t - 1 and t, and  
PPEit is the gross value of Property, Plant and Equipment in year t.  
 
All variables are scaled by the average of firm i’s total assets in years t - 1 and t9. Consistent 
with the prior literature, I winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the 
effect of outliers. The model is based on the idea that regardless of management intent, accru-
als quality is affected by the measurement error in accruals. Intentional estimation error arises 
from incentives to manage earnings, or alternatively, managerial opportunism reflecting in 
financial reporting. For example, intentional estimation errors may be caused by a manager’s 
                                                 
9 The denominators are omitted from the graphical representation for simplicity. 
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desire to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts, endeavors to avoid debt covenant violations, hyp-
ing the share price close to stock offering etc. Unintentional error on the other hand, arises 
e.g. from management lapses and environmental uncertainty. However, the source of the 
measurement error is irrelevant in this approach10.  
 
The level of a firm’s residual accruals per se does not affect accruals quality; a firm can have 
consistently large residuals, while still having relatively good accruals quality because there is 
little uncertainty about its accruals. For such a firm, accruals map poorly into cash flows, but 
since it can be predicted by investors, it should not be a reason for priced uncertainty. It is 
important to note that the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model regresses working capital accru-
als on operating cash flows. That is, the model focuses on working capital accruals as op-
posed to total accruals because cash flow realizations related to working capital generally oc-
cur within one year. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that while the intuition about errors in 
estimation applies to all accruals, the long lags between noncurrent accruals and cash flow 
realizations practically restrict the application of their measure to only short-term accruals11. 
To address this problem, McNichols (2002) suggests that linking the approaches taken by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) with that of taken by Jones (1991)12, i.e. adding change in reve-
nues and PPE to the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, strengthens the accruals es-
timation, thus reducing measurement error. In particular McNichols (2002) argues that change 
in revenues and PPE are important in forming expectations about current accruals.  
3.2 Development of InnAQ and DisAQ 
Motivated by the theoretical model of Yee (2006), as well as the empirical work of Liu and 
Wysocki (2007) and Chen et al. (2008) both taking the position that earnings quality cannot 
be a priced risk factor in the absence of fundamental risk, I decompose total AQ into its innate 
accruals quality (InnAQ) and discretionary accruals quality (DisAQ) components following 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that as in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach the earnings quality measure is based on 
the variance of the error terms, a symmetric loss function is implicitly assumed, i.e. the model doesn’t separate 
between whether the estimation errors accrue from over– or understating future cash flow realizations. 
11 This means that while applying the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to total accruals would in principle 
produce an accruals quality metric that comprehensively measures accruals uncertainty, the long lags between 
non-current accruals and cash flow realizations effectively preclude this extension (Francis et al. 2005). 
12 More specifically, Jones (1991) estimates “normal” accruals as the level captured by the fitted values obtained 
from the regression of total accruals on changes in revenues ȟRev and property, plant, and equipment (PPE), 
where abnormal accruals are the difference between the realized total accruals and “normal accruals” predicted 
by her empirical model. Because abnormal accruals consider both current and non-current accruals, they do not 
suffer from the limitations of the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
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Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). Other than that of Yee (2006), the theo-
retical literature establishing a link between information risk and cost of capital does not dis-
criminate between low earnings quality that is driven by innate components of the firm’s 
business model and operating environment, and poor earnings quality that is discretionary, i.e. 
due to accounting choices, implementation decisions, and managerial error. It cannot be ques-
tioned that a risky operating environment is likely to have implications on the total quality of 
financial reporting; e.g. predicting a correct level of accruals is likely to be considerably more 
difficult if the volume of operations is subject to unpredictable seasonal changes. However, 
the discretionary proportion of accruals quality represents “pure” information risk, i.e. risk 
that arises exclusively from managerial discretion, i.e. reporting choices, implementation de-
cisions and errors.  
 
Chen et al. (2007) argue that the challenge in separating these components is that operating 
risk and information risk are inherently intertwined. In addition, our understanding of what 
drives operating risk and what drives information risk is limited. It is generally accepted in the 
earnings management literature however, that the financial reporting outcome can be decom-
posed into innate and discretionary components, usually discretionary accruals and nondiscre-
tionary earnings, that add up to the reported earnings figure (e.g. Jones 1991). Further, as dis-
cussed in more detail in section 2.4, Guay et al. (1996) suggest that the discretionary compo-
nent of accruals further break up into three distinct subcomponents. The performance meas-
urement subcomponent is expected to reduce information risk, while the other two, the oppor-
tunistic and noise subcomponents are likely to exacerbate information risk, making the net 
effect of these three subcomponents of discretionary accruals quality uncertain. The model 
decomposing AQ into InnAQ and DisAQ is as follows: 
 
 ܣܳ݅ݐ = Ɂ0 + Ɂ1ܵ݅ݖ݁݅ݐ+ Ɂ2ߪ(ܥܨܱ)݅ݐ+ Ɂ3ߪ(݈ܵܽ݁ݏ)݅ݐ+ Ɂ4ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁݅ݐ+ Ɂ5ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊݅ݐ+ ߤ݅ݐ (2) 
 
where: 
 
AQit = ı(İi)t is a firm’s measure of its total accruals quality in year t, 
Sizeit = log(TAit) is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t, 
ı(CFO)it is a firm’s ten-year rolling standard deviation of cash flow from operations (CFO) 
measured from t - 9 to t, 
ı(Sales)it is a firm’s ten-year rolling standard deviation of sales measured from t - 9 to t, 
 
 
26 
 
OperCycleit = log{[(INVit + INVit-1) /2] / (Cogsit /365) + [(ARit + ARit-1) /2] / (Salesit  /365)]} is 
the natural logarithm of the length of a firm’s operating cycle in year t, 
INVit is a firm’s total inventories in year t, 
Cogsit is a firm’s cost of goods sold in year t, 
ARit is a firm’s accounts receivable in year t, 
Salesit is a firm’s sale revenue in year t, 
NegEarnit is the ten-year moving sum of the years when a firm reported negative income be-
fore extraordinary items. The variable is measured between t - 9 and t. 
 
The independent variables in Equation (2) are the innate variables related to total accruals 
quality as identified in Dechow and Dichev (2002). These variables are assumed to capture 
the influence of operating environment and business model on accruals quality, as well as to 
affect discretionary accruals quality. Each of the innate variables is measured on a firm-
specific basis. I require at least five observations in the rolling ten-year window to calculate 
ı(CFO) and ı(Sales), and I require all ten observations in the rolling window to calculate 
NegEarn. ı(CFO) and ı(Sales) are deflated by the average of total assets in t - 1 and t. To 
reduce the effect of outliers and to be consistent with Equation (1), I winsorize all independ-
ent variables to the 1st and 99th percentiles. I estimate Equation (2) in the cross-section every 
year, yielding firm- and year-specific fitted values and residuals. The fitted values represent 
estimates of the innate proportion of firm i’s accruals quality (InnAQ), so that the larger the 
proportion of total AQ explained by innate factors, the less there is discretion in accruals for a 
particular firm and year. InnAQ is defined as: 
 
 ܫ݊݊ܣܳ݅ݐ = Ɂ෠0 + Ɂ෠1ܵ݅ݖ݁݅ݐ+ Ɂ෠2ߪ(ܥܨܱ)݅ݐ+ Ɂ෠3ߪ(݈ܵܽ݁ݏ)݅ݐ+ Ɂ෠4ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁݅ݐ+ Ɂ෠5ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊݅ݐ  
 
The residual from Equation (2) represents the discretionary component of firm i’s accruals 
quality. Thus, DisAQ is defined as follows: 
 
 ܦ݅ݏܣܳ݅ݐ = ߤ݅ݐ  
 
The fact that DisAQ is the residual in the OLS regression means that it has a zero correlation 
with all the explanatory variables. I assume that this fact purges the effect of any fundamental 
risks reflecting in the distribution of the variable, thus warranting that DisAQ measures solely 
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information risk as opposed to fundamental risk. On the other hand, a zero correlation of 
DisAQ with the proposed firm fundamentals may potentially indicate that discretionary ac-
cruals capture just noise in earnings.  
3.3 Sample selection 
For the empirical tests conducted in this thesis, I gather monthly returns data from January 
1970 through December 2006. The returns data are collected from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock file. The returns data is presented in percentages in-
cluding dividends and capital gains, with the appropriate adjustments for splits and stock div-
idends. Further, in order to construct the factor returns described in the next section, I retrieve 
the Fama and French (1993) risk factor returns, as well as the market return and risk-free re-
turn items from the Factors_Monthly file from Wharton Research Data Services (wrds). As 
described above, my earnings quality proxies AQ, InnAQ, and DisAQ are constructed using 
annual financial statements data. These data are collected from Compustat North America 
Fundamentals Annual file. 
 
I match the financial statements data with returns data assuming a three-month delay before 
the reported figures are available to the market participants. For example, for a firm whose 
fiscal year ends on December in year t, I collect monthly returns from April of year t + 1 to 
March of year t + 2. The three-month delay is deemed appropriate because US firms are re-
quired by the SEC to file their financial statements no later than three months from the end of 
the fiscal period. In some asset-pricing papers (e.g. Fama and French 1992), the matching 
convention of financial statements items with returns data has been done in a more conserva-
tive manner, using lags up to six months until the beginning of the returns measurement peri-
od. While this procedure would be safe given the fact that all firms do not comply with the 
SEC deadlines, in this thesis I follow the mainstream of the literature by using a three-month 
matching delay.  
 
AQ and its components are calculated for all firms whose fiscal year-ends fall between Octo-
ber 1968 and August 200613. To begin with, there are a total of 213,602 firm-years in the 
                                                 
13 When the three-month delay is measured from the October 1968 fiscal year-end, that particular firm’s returns 
are assumed to be influenced by the content of the financial statements in the period from February 1969 to Jan-
uary 1970 until new financial statements become public. Correspondingly, August 2006 is the latest fiscal peri-
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sample period. I first require that the records in the Compustat database are presented in US 
dollars. This requirement leaves 209,764 firm-years in the sample period. In addition, about 
10% of the observations are lost because of the requirement that AQ is only calculated for 
firms with at least 20 firms per industry in year t, leaving a total of 189,599 observations in 
the sample period. To avoid spuriously inflating the returns to the trading strategies based on 
accounting-based variables, I further require that a firm has 12 months of non-missing stock 
returns data available following the assumed disclosure of the financial statements (year-end 
+ 3 months). Particularly, Beaver et al. (2007) argue that delisting returns are likely to affect 
estimates of portfolio returns because the expected return conditional on the reason for delist-
ing is generally not zero. Because of this requirement, and the slight differences in the Com-
pustat and CRSP coverage, the sample size is further limited to 169,570 firm-year observa-
tions. From these firm-years, the required data are available to calculate AQ for 97,361, and 
InnAQ and DisAQ for 71,334 of them between January 1970 and December 2006. The signif-
icant reduction in the sample size is mainly attributable to the requirement of 7 years of data 
with non-missing values to estimate Equation (1) and 10 years of non-missing data to estimate 
Equation (2)14.  
 
The distribution of the observations through time is such that there are about 1,300 AQ obser-
vations in 1969 and the yearly observations increase relatively steadily to about 3,200 in 
2006. The mean (median) value of the AQ metric is 0.051 (0.036), which is very similar to 
those documented by Francis et al. (2005) and Kim and Qi (2010)15. Further, the mean (medi-
an) value of the InnAQ metric is 0.047 (0.041). Note that the sample means for total AQ and 
InnAQ are by construction identical, as InnAQ is the fitted value of total AQ. However, as 
described above, the ten-year lags of the summary indicators needed to estimate InnAQ sub-
tracts the variable’s sample size compared to that of total AQ. Finally, the mean (median) 
value of the DisAQ metric is 0.000 (-0.004). 
 
I consider potential sample selection bias arising from the extensive data requirements im-
posed by the earnings quality proxies. I would expect the data requirements to bias my sample 
                                                                                                                                                        
od-end month in which reported financial statements are assumed make it in time to influence returns in Decem-
ber 2006, given the three-month delay. 
14 Note that Equation (1) includes both lead and lag cash flows. Also bear in mind that the NegEarn summary 
indicator in Equation (2) is based on a ten-year moving sum of negative earnings figures, thus imposing estima-
tion of InnAQ and DisAQ to a 10-year data requirement with non-missing values.  
15 Francis et al. (2005) report a mean (median) AQ of 0.044 (0.031) while Kim and Qi (2010) report a mean 
(median) AQ of 0.054 (0.037). 
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towards surviving firms which tend to be larger and more successful than the population on 
average. I am able to measure however, only small differences in the sample means (medians) 
relative to the Compustat population means (medians). For example, the mean (median) total 
assets of firms in my sample are $1,565 million ($127 million), ROA 1.9% (2.2%), and sales 
growth 11.9% (9.3%). The corresponding population characteristics are $1,576 million ($127 
million) for total assets, and 0.8% (1.8%) and 15.5% (10.9%) for ROA and sales growth re-
spectively. Based on the median figures, the sample firms are larger and more profitable, but 
their growth is slower than the population firms’. Based on the mean figures however, the 
sample firms are below the population mean in size and growth. Even though this is surpris-
ing, the differences are relatively small in economic terms, and I conclude that they are un-
likely to affect the generalizability of the results. 
 
Table I Panel A presents the average results from yearly regressions of Equation (2), which 
decomposes total AQ into InnAQ and DisAQ. The reader should note that the results present-
ed in Table I are based on regressions before matching the Compustat annual data to the 
CRSP monthly returns data. This means that the composition of the observations in the sam-
ple deviates slightly from the one described above (and used in the asset-pricing tests), and 
the results in Table I are solely presented to demonstrate the associations of the innate factors 
with the AQ metric. The reported coefficient estimates Ɂ෠ത௞ are the averages of 38 yearly esti-
mations over the period 1969-2006, estimated from a common sample of 90,669 firm-year 
observations from which AQ, InnAQ and DisAQ can be calculated. T-statistics are based on 
the time series standard errors of the coefficient estimates Ɂ෠௞௧. The average Adjusted R
2 of 
43.1%, i.e. the average explanatory power of the model, while being very close to the results 
documented in Francis et al. (2005) and Dechow and Dichev (2002), implies relatively tight 
fit when total AQ is presented as a function of its innate components. All the coefficient signs 
are as expected based on the results of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), 
Size being the only variable negatively related to total AQ while all the other variables are 
positively related to the dependent variable. These results suggest that while Size is inversely 
related to a firm’s overall fundamental risk, the measures of operating volatility (ı(CFO)) and 
ı(Sales)), alongside with frequency of loss years (NegEarn) are perceived to increase funda-
mental risk. Moreover, a long operating cycle (OperCycle) reflecting in high levels of inven-
tory and long collection periods of receivables are positively related to overall fundamental 
risk. All t-statistics are significant at all conventional significance levels, supporting the find-
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ings from previous literature that the AQ metric is strongly correlated with fundamental risk 
variables. 
 
Panel B of Table I presents the summary statistics of AQ, InnAQ, and DisAQ. Since by con-
struction the mean of DisAQ is zero16, the mean InnAQ is identical to that of total AQ. None-
theless, the standard deviation of DisAQ of 0.078 indicates that there is considerable variation 
around the sample mean. For example, the standard deviation of DisAQ is much larger in 
magnitude than the standard deviation of InnAQ. The variation in DisAQ amplifies the varia-
tion in total AQ, which can be observed from the larger standard deviation of total AQ com-
pared to that of InnAQ, as well as the fact that the extreme percentiles for the distribution of 
total AQ are considerably further from the sample mean than those of InnAQ, reflecting wider 
distribution for total AQ and additional variation introduced to it by DisAQ. This is in line 
with Guay et al.’s (1996) findings that noise is only one of the three subcomponents of discre-
tionary accruals, and likely to be dominated by the other two. It also further motivates the 
more extensive analysis of the pricing effect of discretionary accruals quality. The negative 
median of DisAQ indicates maybe surprisingly, that for a median firm, DisAQ increases total 
accruals quality (i.e. decreases the total AQ metric), which is consistent with the performance 
measurement hypothesis presented in Guay et al. (1996). 
  
                                                 
16 Note that DisAQ is the residual term from an OLS regression, which is always fitted in a manner that the re-
sidual sum of squares is minimized. In effect, this means that the average of the error terms always becomes 
zero. 
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Table I: Regressions of AQ on innate components 
Table I 
Regressions of AQ on innate components 
 
Panel A: Regressions of AQ on innate components 
  Pred. sign  Ɂ෠ത௞ t-statistic   
  Intercept ?  0.012 3.57**   
Size -  -0.003 -9.18**   
ı(CFO) +  0.286 22.69**   
ı(Sales) +  0.025 12.30**   
OperCycle +  0.003 8.99**   
NegEarn +  0.003 8.61**   
        
Adj. R2   0.431     
n   38     
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
  AQ 0.058 0.098 0.008 0.020 0.036 0.066 0.168 
InnAQ 0.058 0.060 0.011 0.025 0.043 0.072 0.147 
DisAQ 0.000 0.078 -0.055 -0.018 -0.004 0.010 0.059 
Panel A provides results from regressions where total AQ is presented as a function of its innate components as 
suggested in Dechow and Dichev (2002). Coefficient estimates Ɂ෠ത୩ and Adj. R2s are based on the averages of 
1969-2006 yearly estimates, and t-statistics are based on time series standard errors of the 38 coefficient esti-
mates. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ı(CFO) and ı(Sales) are the ten-year rolling standard devia-
tions of operating cash flow and sales deflated by the average total assets. OperCycle is the natural logarithm of 
a firm’s operating cycle, measured as the sum of days in accounts receivable and days in inventory. NegEarn is 
the incidence of negative earnings during the past ten years. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of AQ, 
InnAQ, and DisAQ. AQ is the five-year standard deviation of the firm-specific residuals from Model (1), InnAQ 
is the fitted value, and DisAQ is the residual from Model (2). * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance levels. 
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4 RISK FACTOR RETURNS 
In the previous section, the proxy variables used to depict earnings quality and its subcompo-
nents in this thesis were constructed. Another fundamental task in examining a relationship 
between earnings quality and equity cost of capital is to develop a proxy for the latter. As the 
method of estimating cost of capital has serious implications on the research design, the issue 
is addressed in more detail in this section. Moving forward, the risk factor returns represent-
ing the systematic components of the proposed risk factors are constructed. 
4.1 Limitations to measuring cost of capital 
Since observing the possible effect of information risk on cost of capital is critical to the 
measurement of cost of capital, I am going to discuss here the alternative procedures present-
ed in the prior literature. Generally, cost of equity capital is regarded as the discount rate the 
market applies to a firm’s expected future cash flows to arrive at the current stock price. The 
challenge in its measurement however, is that the discount rate cannot be readily observed 
(Botosan and Plumlee 2005). Realized returns are a traditional and most often employed 
proxy for expected returns in the empirical asset-pricing literature. For example Elton (1999) 
states that almost all of the testing of asset-pricing theories found in the literature involves 
using realized returns as a proxy for expected returns. The use of average realized returns as a 
proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that ex ante information surprises tend to cancel 
out in the aggregate, so that it is appropriate to use future realized returns as proxies for ex-
pected returns. The realized return approach brings about two advantages. First, it is not based 
on estimates of cost of equity, so it is not subject to similar concerns about measurement er-
ror. Second, it allows much larger sample sizes compared to a number of implied cost of capi-
tal estimates, as the returns data availability is better than the cost of capital estimates based 
on e.g. analyst forecasts, thus mitigating selection bias.  
 
The main criticism against using realized returns to proxy for expected returns is that realized 
returns may be biased over the period of study, even if that period was several years long. 
Elton (1999) points out that there are periods even longer than ten years (1973-1984), during 
which stock market realized returns are on average less than the risk-free rate. In addition, 
Fama and French (2002) show using earnings- and dividend growth model based estimates of 
expected returns, that during their sample period of 1951-2000 the average realized stock re-
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turns implied equity risk premium over 70% larger than the risk-premium implied by earnings 
and dividend growth models. Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that infor-
mation surprises do not necessarily cancel out in the aggregate, even if the measurement peri-
od is relatively long, making realized returns a noisy and biased estimate of expected returns. 
In general however, such a bias will not affect analyses of cross-sectional variation in ex-
pected returns, because the bias tends to be similar for all stocks in the population at a given 
time t.  
 
For the above mentioned reasons, another strand of literature applies accounting-based esti-
mates of cost of capital in examining the market pricing implications of a number of funda-
mentals. Easton and Monahan (2005) evaluate the reliability of seven alternative accounting-
based expected returns proxies and find that for the entire cross-section of firms, each of these 
proxies is unreliable. Their results are based on the finding that none of the proxies has posi-
tive association with realized returns, even after controlling for the bias and noise in realized 
returns attributable to contemporaneous information surprises. Moreover, Easton and Mo-
nahan (2005) find that the simplest expected returns proxy which is based on the least reason-
able assumptions, contains no more measurement error with respect to realized returns than 
the remaining proxies. On the contrary, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) study five alternative 
accounting-based cost of capital metrics based on regressions of expected returns proxies on 
assumed risk factors, and find that two of these proxies are consistently and predictably relat-
ed to these assumed risk factors. However, as argued by Easton and Monahan (2005), con-
cluding that a cost of capital metric proxies expected returns in this manner implicitly as-
sumes that the risk factors evaluated are correct and exhaustive, which is unlikely to be the 
case in reality17. 
 
Because of the unreliability issues of the accounting-based cost of capital metrics, and the fact 
that using realized returns as a proxy for expected returns seems to be the standard procedure 
in the asset-pricing literature, I use realized returns to proxy for expected returns in this thesis. 
Moreover, as the sample employed in this thesis is a fairly extensive representation of the 
population and the period under review is long, I have good grounds to believe that infor-
mation surprises are not the driving force of the results. 
                                                 
17 For a review of accounting-based cost of capital metrics, see Easton and Monahan (2005); Botosan and Plum-
lee (2005). 
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4.2 Risk factors  
In this section, I construct the factor mimicking portfolios for total AQ, InnAQ, and DisAQ. 
The idea behind this is that according to modern finance theory such as the CAPM, a firm-
specific risk characteristic cannot be priced because it represents idiosyncratic risk which can 
be diversified in large economies. For example, any well-diversified mutual fund will bid 
prices up until the discount on idiosyncratic risk becomes zero. In order to construct a risk 
factor related to a certain firm characteristic, a researcher must calculate the returns of a port-
folio formed by that risk characteristic. The difference, i.e. the factor return, then is the pre-
mium associated with that particular risk, and the exposure to the premium affects cross-
sectional expected returns despite the forces of diversification18. 
4.2.1 Accruals quality factor returns 
I first follow Francis et al. (2005) in calculating the total accruals quality factor return as the 
return on a zero investment portfolio long in the top four AQ decile portfolios and short in the 
bottom four AQ decile portfolios. I call this risk factor AQfactor, and it represents premium 
on the systematic component of total accruals quality risk. Using a similar procedure, I then 
calculate similar series of risk factor returns for InnAQ and DisAQ, which are called Innfactor 
and Disfactor respectively. In the asset-pricing tests, I control the effect of the three other 
widely-accepted risk factors that are likely to affect returns. These risk factors are presented in 
subsection 4.2.3. 
 
In order to construct the total accruals quality risk factor, I sort all firms with available data on 
total AQ into ten decile portfolios at the beginning of each month based on their most recent 
available values of AQ. I assume that the most recent value of AQ is available to the public 
three months after the firm’s fiscal year-end. This means that, for example to calculate 
AQfactor for April 2000, firms are ranked into decile portfolios based on their value of AQ 
from fiscal year-ends between January 1999 and December 1999. Firms with lowest AQ val-
ues (best accruals quality) are assigned to portfolio 1 and correspondingly, firms with highest 
AQ values (worst accruals quality) are placed in portfolio 10. AQfactor is then calculated as 
the difference between the equal-weighted mean excess returns of the top four decile portfoli-
os and the bottom four decile portfolios. Similar portfolio formation technique has been used 
                                                 
18 Epstein and Schneider (2008) show that even idiosyncratic risks may be prices in the cross-section of firms as 
long as the signals about those risks are ambiguous. 
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in e.g. Francis et al. (2005), Core et al. (2008) and Kim and Qi (2010). The portfolio for-
mation technique, which in effect rebalances the AQ decile sorted portfolios every month, 
allows differences in a firm’s fiscal year-end as well as over-time changes in accruals quality. 
Consequently, AQfactor is also rebalanced monthly19. 
 
Table II presents the AQ decile portfolio averages of realized monthly returns, firm-specific 
betas, the popular risk proxies of market value of common equity and book-to-market ratio, as 
well as the portfolio average share price. Next to the AQ portfolio column is presented the 
average value of the AQ metric in each of the decile portfolios. Not surprisingly, the average 
AQ values increase with the portfolio, since the portfolios are formed based on the sorted val-
ues of the AQ measure. Average monthly returns increase almost monotonically from the 
monthly return of 1.30% in decile 1 to 1.58% in decile 10. The monthly difference in returns 
of 0.28% implies an annualized difference of about 3.4%, but is not statistically different from 
zero. Firm-specific betas increase monotonically throughout the sorted decile portfolios. The 
difference in betas between the two extremes of 0.51 is highly statistically significant and 
implies a difference in annual returns of about 3.1%, assuming a 6% annual equity risk pre-
mium. The combined results of the two columns provide support for the notion that accruals 
quality is negatively related to expected returns. However, nothing at this point can be said 
about whether AQ is the causing effect of the increasing returns pattern when moving from 
the smallest portfolio upward. Indeed, it also seems that the commonly used risk proxies, size 
and book-to-market ratio are almost monotonically related to the decile rank of AQ, suggest-
ing that one should be cautious attributing the difference in returns to AQ. Finally, the last 
column reveals that the average share price is inversely related to AQ, that is, low AQ (high 
accruals quality) firms have a high share price and vice versa. The combined findings from 
the last three columns also suggest that AQ is inversely related to firm age, because older 
firms typically are large value firms (i.e. have high market capitalization and book-to-market 
ratio) with a high share price.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Core et al. (2008) discuss the potential bias associated with rebalancing equal-weighted portfolios on a month-
ly basis. This upward bias in portfolio returns discovered in Blume and Stambaugh (1983) arises from the bid-
ask effect and is more pronounced with daily returns. Core et al. (2008) discuss managing this ‘bid-ask’ bias by 
rebalancing the AQ-sorted portfolios on yearly basis, but yet conclude that their results are not sensitive to the 
frequency of the portfolio rebalancing. Since I measure portfolio returns on a monthly basis in this thesis, I am 
not overly concerned with this ‘bid-ask’ bias.   
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  Table II: Average monthly returns of the AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
Table II 
 Average monthly returns of the AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
 
AQ Port-
folio  
Average 
AQ  
Return 
(%)  Beta  
Market 
Cap  
Book-to-
Market*1  Price ($) 
  1  0.009  1.31  0.79  2392  1.71  25.51 
2  0.016  1.33  0.98  1911  1.87  23.04 
3  0.022  1.41  1.04  1688  1.67  20.54 
4  0.028  1.39  1.07  1298  1.64  17.82 
5  0.034  1.42  1.10  1114  1.46  16.00 
6  0.041  1.44  1.13  918  1.29  14.18 
7  0.051  1.43  1.16  630  1.25  12.38 
8  0.064  1.53  1.19  438  1.18  9.70 
9  0.085  1.55  1.23  312  1.02  7.90 
10  0.158  1.58  1.30  198  0.89  5.68   Average  0.051  1.44  1.10  1090  1.40  15.27 
             P10 - P1  0.150  0.28  0.51  -2194  -0.82  -19.83 
t-statistic  51.06
**  0.93  56.69
**  -26.80
**  -23.29
**  -122.19
** 
All firms with available accruals quality measures are assigned into one of ten decile portfolios based on their 
most recent value of AQ. Portfolio 1 (10) contains firms with the smallest (largest) AQs. AQ is a firm’s 5-year 
standard deviation of residual accruals. Return (%) is the equal-weighted average of the portfolio firms’ monthly 
raw returns. Beta is calculated as the average of the 8,827 firm-specific beta estimates obtained from the whole 
sample period market-model regressions, where the estimation period is at minimum 24 months. Market Cap is 
the average market capitalization in $ millions of the firms in the portfolio. Book-to-Market is the average of 
book equity to market equity ratios of the firms in the portfolio. Price is the average dollar-price of the shares in 
the portfolio. The Average row represents the sample means of the 9,935 firms for which AQ can be calculated 
between January 1970 and December 2006. P10 – P1 is the difference between the averages of the largest and 
the smallest AQ portfolios, along with t-statistics of zero difference. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance 
levels. *1 signifies extreme values being winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of AQ’s relation to fundamental risk, I consider a set of 
accounting and financial variables sorted by AQ decile rank that are likely to increase the 
fundamental risk of firms, and may thus induce uncertainty about future cash flows. This 
analysis is thus explorative by nature and is motivated by the argument of Dechow et al. 
(2010) that although the quality of a firm’s earnings depends on both the firm’s financial per-
formance and on the accounting system that measures it, we have relatively little evidence 
about how fundamental performance affects earnings quality. The first five columns after the 
index column in Table III present the innate components of firms’ accruals quality as suggest-
ed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). As can be seen from the table, all of the innate components 
either increase or decrease monotonically with AQ, the signs being as predicted in the regres-
sion of total AQ on the innate components. Other than just confirming the regression results 
in Table I, the results here confirm that all the innate variables are linearly related to the decile 
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ranks of AQ. Moving forward, the next two columns indicate a monotonic increase in R&D 
ratio and sales growth when moving from the best AQ decile to the worst one. This is con-
sistent with the notion that poorer AQ firms tend to be growth firms who typically engage 
more in R&D activity, while higher AQ firms are slower-growing value firms operating in 
more mature lines of business. The next column shows that leverage decreases monotonically 
with the AQ portfolio rank. This finding conflicts with AQ being positively related to funda-
mental risk. I assume however, that the higher proportion of debt finance for poor accruals 
quality firms stems more from the supposedly early stage of life cycle of those firms, whereas 
taking debt is typically cheaper for firms at more mature stage of life cycle. In addition, firms 
whose operating environment is less risky are likely to take more financial leverage, because 
they are likely to enter the debt market at more favorable terms.  
 
I further consider profitability as a source of fundamental risk. It can be seen that ROA de-
creases with AQ rank, suggesting that poor AQ firms are the ones least profitable. However, it 
seems that the pattern is so that two poorest AQ decile portfolios are considerably below av-
erage, while the other decile portfolio means are relatively tightly tied around the sample 
mean. Finally, I consider the proportion of firms in the decile portfolios that are audited by 
one of the BIG4 firms. BIG4 decreases monotonically with AQ, suggesting that auditor may 
have some role as a determinant of a firm’s accruals quality. As auditors typically have a say 
in a firm’s reporting practices but not so much to its operations, the BIG4 variable here repre-
sent more information risk than fundamental risk. Overall, based on the relative differences 
and corresponding t-statistics in portfolio averages between the worst AQ portfolio and the 
best AQ portfolio, it seems that the innate components of AQ factor suggested by Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) succeed relatively well in capturing the fundamental risk in a firm’s accru-
als quality. In particular, each of the P10-P1 t-statistics of Size, ı(CFO), ı(CFO), OperCycle 
and NegEarn are larger than the fundamental risk variables that I try in the later columns. 
However, even though discovering incremental explanatory innate variables besides those 
suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002) is left outside the scope of this thesis, the results in 
Table III suggest that there are potentially a number of other variables associated with a firm’s 
fundamental risk that are significantly related to AQ. Discovering these variables could im-
prove the decomposition of total AQ into its subcomponents, thus reducing measurement er-
ror and potentially making the pricing effects of InnAQ and DisAQ more prominent. 
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ti Table III: Selected characteristics of the AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
Table III 
 Selected characteristics of the AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
 
AQ Port-
folio  Size
*1  ı(CFO)
*1  ı(Sales)
*1  
OperCy-
cle*1  NegEarn  
R&D 
ratio*1  
Sales 
growth*1  
Lever-
age*1  ROA
*1  BIG4 
  1  6.66  3.73  14.40  104.30  3.71  2.36  10.25  30.67  2.63  92.27 
2  5.99  5.22  18.89  124.47  7.59  3.00  10.99  25.77  2.69  90.31 
3  5.63  6.06  21.02  133.47  9.15  3.58  11.17  23.99  2.64  89.14 
4  5.37  6.95  22.63  141.01  10.74  4.05  11.41  23.74  2.50  88.59 
5  5.08  7.72  24.26  146.52  13.07  4.55  11.95  23.50  2.43  86.73 
6  4.77  8.71  26.90  151.13  15.50  5.16  12.22  23.05  2.18  85.10 
7  4.53  9.77  29.29  155.33  18.22  5.68  12.40  23.37  1.91  83.90 
8  4.18  11.36  32.39  158.85  22.60  6.14  12.61  23.22  1.59  81.18 
9  3.84  13.78  37.38  170.46  27.78  7.32  12.62  23.53  0.99  79.05 
10  3.30  19.61  45.39  194.68  37.26  9.68  13.37  24.41  -0.18  75.94   Average  4.94  9.29  27.26  148.02  16.56  5.15  11.90  24.52  1.94  85.22 
                     P10 - P1  -3.36  15.95  31.16  89.82  33.55  7.32  3.12  -6.26  -2.81  -16.33 
t-statistic  -116.34
**  51.74
**  152.84
**  52.69
**  61.26
**  30.26**  13.93**  -21.88**  -35.13**  -31.30** 
All firms with available AQ metrics are assigned to one of the ten decile portfolios based on their most recent AQ value. Portfolio 1 (10) contains firms with the smallest 
(largest) value of AQ. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ millions. ı(CFO) (ı(Sales)) is the rolling standard deviation of a firm’s operating cash flow (sales) in 
percentages from the last ten years, however, at minimum five years. OperCycle is the length of a firm’s operating cycle, measured as the sum of days in accounts receivable 
and days in inventory. NegEarn is the %-frequency of negative earnings before extraordinary items during the past ten years. R&D Ratio is research and development expense 
divided by total assets expressed in percentage terms. Sales growth is the %-change in a firm’s sales revenue between years t - 1 and t. Leverage is the ratio of a firm’s total 
debt to total assets. ROA is earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets. BIG4 is the proportion of firms in the portfolio, who were audited by one of BIG4 audit 
firms. The Average row represents the sample means of the 9,935 firms for which AQ can be calculated between January 1970 and December 2006.  P10 – P1 is the differ-
ence between the averages of the largest and the smallest AQ portfolios, along with t-statistics of zero difference. *, ** denote 5% and 1% significance levels.*1 signifies that 
the distribution of the variable has been winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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4.2.2 Innate accruals quality and discretionary accruals quality factor returns 
Using a similar procedure as the one described in the previous section, I construct the innate 
AQ factor mimicking portfolio, which I will call Innfactor and discretionary AQ factor mim-
icking portfolio called Disfactor. That is, at the beginning of each month I sort all firms with 
available data into ten decile portfolios by InnAQ and DisAQ, which are calculated based on 
the most recent available financial statements. Innfactor and Disfactor are then calculated as 
the difference in mean excess returns between the top four portfolios and the bottom four 
portfolios.  
 
In Appendix 1 I show that the average monthly returns and common risk factors of InnAQ 
sorted decile portfolios are very similar to those of total AQ sorted portfolios, expect for the 
fact that the increasing or decreasing patterns with the decile rank of InnAQ are in fact steep-
er. Overall this implies that InnAQ has very similar market pricing effects to those of total 
AQ. While the difference in mean returns between the highest InnAQ portfolio and the lowest 
InnAQ portfolio of 0.43 implies an annualized risk premium of over 5%, the difference in 
betas between the two extreme portfolios of 0.48 implies a risk premium of slightly below 3% 
assuming a 6% market risk premium. When these results are compared to the ones presented 
in Table II, it can be observed that InnAQ appears to be driving the pricing effect of total AQ. 
In contrast, I find no such systematic pattern in Appendix 1 for DisAQ sorted decile portfoli-
os, except for the fact that high DisAQ sorted decile portfolios tend to contain larger firms 
with higher book-to-market ratios than low DisAQ portfolios, implying that large and value 
firms exercise more discretion in recording their accruals than do small and growth firms. 
Interestingly however, both of these variables exhibit increasing patterns until they peak at 
DisAQ portfolio number 8, after which they start declining. These findings are particularly 
interesting given the fact the increasing patters are exactly opposite to the decreasing patterns 
exhibited by total AQ decile portfolios and InnAQ decile portfolios. Appendix 2 reports the 
portfolio means in selected firm characteristics also presented in Table III, only this time sort-
ed by InnAQ and DisAQ decile ranks. As was the case regarding the returns and risk varia-
bles in Appendix 1, also here the InnAQ sorted decile portfolios exhibit systematic increasing 
or decreasing patterns with the portfolio rank, alike total AQ sorted portfolios. By contrast, 
the DisAQ sorted decile portfolios exhibit only weak systematic patterns, either increasing or 
decreasing.  
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4.2.3 Other risk factors 
I also employ three additional widely-accepted risk factors in the asset-pricing tests to control 
for other firm fundamentals that are likely affecting expected returns. First, MKT is the aver-
age monthly value-weighted return of the market in excess of the risk-free return, i.e. it is the 
return of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks in month m minus the one-month Treasury 
bill rate in that month. The Fama and French (1993) risk factors SMB and HML are calculat-
ed by constructing six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and the ratio of book value of 
equity to market value of equity. SMB is the average return of the three small portfolios mi-
nus the average return on the three big portfolios. HML is the average return of the two value 
portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios. Overall, the SMB and HML 
factors capture the empirically observed effect of a negative relation between firm size and 
average returns, and a positive relation between book-to-market equity ratio and average re-
turns. Although one could theoretically construct a factor return based on any sorted variable, 
Fama and French (1993) argue that the exposure to SMB and HML factor returns should rea-
sonably well capture any of the potential effects of particular firm fundamentals on expected 
returns. 
 
Panel A of Table IV presents the descriptive statistics of the AQfactor, Innfactor, and Disfac-
tor as well as the three Fama and French (1993) risk factors computed at the monthly level 
from the 444 months between January 1970 and December 2006. The average monthly risk 
premium of the AQfactor of 0.165% implies a mean annual risk premium of over 2%, but is 
not statistically different from zero (t-statistic = 0.98). The average monthly risk premium of 
Innfactor of 0.220% implies an annual risk premium of over 2.6%, but alike AQfactor, also 
Innfactor is statistically insignificant (t-statistic = 1.12). It is yet interesting that the average 
risk premium of innate accruals quality is larger than that of total accruals quality. The aver-
age return of Disfactor for one’s part is negative at -0.071% (with annualized return of about -
0.9%), but again not statistically different from zero (t-statistic = -1.48). Moreover, the annu-
alized return of Disfactor of about -0.9% is relatively small in economic terms. The summary 
statistics of the other factor returns are as documented in the previous literature, MKT and 
HML being the largest factor returns both in statistic and in economic terms. 
 
Panel B of Table IV presents the pair-wise correlations of the monthly risk factor returns. 
AQfactor is positively correlated with MKT and SMB, and negatively correlated with HML. 
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The correlation is particularly strong between AQfactor and SMB at 0.712, which is because 
larger firms tend to have higher accruals quality (lower values of AQ) consistent with the re-
sults in Tables II and III. Innfactor correlates with MKT, SMB, and HML almost in an identi-
cal manner with AQfactor, which is because of the extremely strong (0.962) correlation be-
tween the two variables. The correlation this high is unexpected even though InnAQ is a line-
ar representation of total AQ. Disfactor correlates positively with MKT, and negatively with 
SMB and HML. While the absolute values of the correlation coefficients are smaller, they are 
yet statistically significant at 1%, except for the insignificant negative correlation between 
Disfactor and HML. The negative correlations of Disfactor with AQfactor and Innfactor are 
expected since InnAQ and DisAQ add up to total AQ. However, the fact that Disfactor corre-
lates negatively and somewhat strongly (-0.438) with SMB is surprising while suggesting that 
large firms have higher discretionary accruals than do small firms (consistent evidence has 
also been found in Appendix 1). The interpretation of these findings may be that while man-
agers of large firms are likely to be more senior and skilled than managers of small firms, they 
possess more skills and incentives to provide private information to the market. The potential 
incentives of managers of larger firms could relate to e.g. reputational reasons and desire to 
better serve shareholders by increasing the value-relevance of financial statements through 
disclosure of private information. 
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  Table IV: Descriptive statistics and correlations of factor returns 
Table IV 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations of factor returns 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, % 
   Mean STD Min Median Max t-statistic 
 MKT 0.494 4.544 -23.140 0.835 16.050 2.29* 
SMB 0.175 3.301 -16.670 0.035 22.190 1.12 
HML 0.504 3.057 -12.780 0.490 13.840 3.47** 
AQfactor 0.165 3.537 -11.112 -0.213 25.219 0.98 
Innfactor 0.220 4.134 -12.864 -0.266 24.997 1.12 
Disfactor -0.071 1.002 -5.206 -0.036 4.234 -1.48 
Panel B: Correlation matrix of the risk factors 
   MKT SMB HML AQfactor Innfactor Disfactor 
 MKT 1      
SMB 0.281** 1     
HML -0.444** -0.305** 1    
AQfactor 0.365** 0.712** -0.438** 1   
Innfactor 0.314** 0.764** -0.335** 0.962** 1  
Disfactor 0.139** -0.424** -0.086 -0.240** -0.394** 1 
Table IV provides descriptive statistics and pair-wise (Pearson) correlations of the three Fama-French (1993) 
risk factors, as well as the AQfactor, Innfactor, and Disfactor computed at the monthly level in the 444 months 
between January 1970 and December 2006. MKT is the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, 
SMB is the return on the size factor mimicking portfolio, HML is the return on the book-to-market factor mim-
icking portfolio, AQfactor is the return on the total accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio, Innfactor is the 
return on the innate accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio, and Disfactor is the return on the discretionary 
accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio. *, ** denote 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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5 ASSET-PRICING TESTS 
In this section, the asset-pricing tests are conducted in order to examine whether AQ is priced 
and whether the pricing effect should be attributed to innate or discretionary accruals quality. 
The section begins by examining the factor loadings in time series asset-pricing models, and 
then moves on to two-stage cross-sectional asset-pricing regressions, which are considered in 
the previous literature the correct method to conclude whether a proposed risk factor is priced.  
5.1  Examination of factor loadings in time series asset-pricing models 
In their influential paper, Francis et al. (2005) conclude, partly based on the factor loading on 
the AQ factor mimicking portfolio, that earnings quality is priced in the capital market. In this 
section, I replicate Francis et al.’s (2005) time series regressions in order to investigate the 
association of first AQfactor separately, and then divided into Innfactor and Disfactor, on 
contemporaneous excess returns. As I will later describe in more detail, while this analysis is 
informative in understanding how these proposed risk factors are related to returns, it is as 
such insufficient evidence for a researcher to conclude that a proposed risk factor affects ex-
pected returns. 
 
Specifically, I run a time series regression of monthly excess stock returns on contemporane-
ous risk factor returns for each of the 21,518 firms in the CRSP database with at least 24 
monthly returns observations between January 1970 and December 2006. I employ market 
excess return (MKT), return on size factor mimicking portfolio (SMB), and return book-to-
market factor mimicking portfolio (HML) as control variables in the regressions, in order to 
prevent the models from being misspecified20. Consequently, I estimate the following regres-
sion equation, where subscripts i and m denote individual stock and month respectively. If a 
proposed risk factor is related to contemporaneous returns, it should load significantly in time 
series regressions. 
 
 ܴ௜௠ െ ܴி௠ = Ⱦ଴ + Ⱦଵ௜ܯܭܶ + Ⱦଶ௜ܵܯܤ௠ + Ⱦଷ௜ܪܯܮ௠ + Ⱦସ௜ܣ݂ܳܽܿݐ݋ݎ௠+ Ⱦହ௜ܫ݂݊݊ܽܿݐ݋ݎ௠ + Ⱦ଺௜ܦ݅ݏ݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ௠ + ߱௜௠ (3) 
 
                                                 
20 If a regression model is misspecified, i.e. it suffers from a relevant omitted explanatory variable the included 
explanatory variables pick up the effect of the omitted ones, as long as the variables are correlated. This makes 
the included regressors biased and inconsistent, even if the sample size becomes large. (Gujarati 2003, p. 510)  
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where:  
 
Rim = is the firm i’s return in month m, 
RFm = is the risk-free return in month m, 
Other variables are as described in section 4.2. 
 
In Table V, the reported coefficient estimates Ⱦ෠ത௞ are the averages of the 21,518 coefficient 
estimates Ⱦ෠௞௜ obtained from firm-specific time series regressions. T-statistics are based on the 
time series standard errors of the coefficient estimates. Model (1) documents the results from 
regressions of firm excess returns on market risk premium (MKT), and the Fama and French 
(1993) risk factors (SMB) and (HML). The average coefficient estimate of MKT is close to 
one and highly significantly positive (t-statistic = 163.90). This is not surprising given the fact 
that the market portfolio’s beta with respect to itself is one by definition (assuming no other 
explanatory variables). The average coefficient estimates of SMB and HML are also signifi-
cantly positive at 0.920 and 0.217 (t-statistics = 109.08; 23.44). The strong association with 
returns may well be expected, since Fama and French first (1993) introduced these additional 
risk factors because of their ability to explain risk over and above market beta. The model 
explains on average 15.4% of the variation in firms’ returns.   
 
In Model (2), I add AQfactor as an additional risk factor to proxy for the exposure of to the 
systematic component of accruals quality risk. The inclusion of AQfactor increases the mod-
el’s average adjusted R2 to 16.9%, indicating a nontrivial increase in the explanatory power. 
More importantly, AQfactor is positively associated with firm excess returns, the average 
coefficient estimate (0.345) being highly significant (t-statistic = 55.41). MKT, SMB and 
HML also remain significant at all conventional levels. The other coefficient estimates also 
remain relatively unchanged in magnitudes, except for the average coefficient estimate of 
SMB which almost halves (from 0.920 to 0.496), confirming the partly overlapping effect of 
AQfactor with SMB. The strong influence of AQfactor on SMB can be expected based on 
their strong pair-wise correlation (0.712) documented in Table IV. Overall, these results are 
very similar to the results obtained by Francis et al. (2005).  
 
In Model (3), I replace AQfactor by Innfactor and Disfactor to investigate the factor loadings 
of these two alternative sources of accruals quality separately. The average coefficients esti-
mate of Innfactor is highly significantly positive at 0.624 (t-statistic = 52.41). However, the 
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factor loading is nonetheless lower than that of AQfactor. The factor loading of Disfactor on 
the other hand, is considerably lower at 0.131, as is its t-statistics of 4.98, while still being 
significant at 1%. Replacing AQfactor by Innfactor and Disfactor has only a small effect on 
the coefficient estimates and significance levels of MKT, SMB, and HML. Moreover, the 
increase in the average adjusted R2 is negligible from 0.169 to 0.171, suggesting that the mar-
ket attaches only little value on Innfactor and Disfactor over AQfactor. 
 
Table V: Firm-specific time series regressions 
Table V 
 Firm-specific time series regressions 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Ⱦ෠ത௞ t-statistic  Ⱦ
෠ത
௞ t-statistic  Ⱦ
෠ത
௞ t-statistic 
 
 Intercept -0.001 -7.92**  -0.003 -14.01
**  -0.002 -12.78
** 
MKT 0.950 163.90**  0.886 150.29
**  0.905 145.18
** 
SMB 0.920 109.08**  0.496 49.27
**  0.445 39.79
** 
HML 0.217 23.44**  0.376 41.06
**  0.316 34.23
** 
AQfactor    0.689 55.41
**    
Innfactor       0.624 52.41
** 
Disfactor       0.131 4.98
** 
         
Adj. R2 0.154   0.169   0.171  
n 21,518   21,518   21,518  
  
Table V presents the results of 21,518 firm-specific time series regressions of monthly excess stock returns (raw 
return minus the risk free rate) on the three Fama-French (1993) factors and the AQ factor, Innfactor, and Dis-
factor. Each time series regression has at least 24 monthly returns observations. MKT is the excess return of the 
market portfolio, SMB is the return of size factor mimicking portfolio, HML is the return of book-to-market 
factor mimicking portfolio, AQfactor is the return of the accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio, Innfactor is 
the return of the innate accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio, and Disfactor is the return of the discretion-
ary accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. T-
statistics are computed based on the time series standard errors of the coefficient estimates. 
 
Taken together, it seems based on the results in Table V that AQfactor is significantly posi-
tively associated with contemporaneous returns, even once controlled with Fama and French 
(1993) risk factors. The results in terms of the magnitudes of coefficient estimates are roughly 
similar for AQfactor and Innfactor, whereas Disfactor displays a smaller role in determining 
time series returns both in economic and statistical terms. As a sensitivity check, I also repeat 
the analysis using a sample of the 9,894 firms for which AQ can be calculated during the pe-
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riod under review (not reported). The results remain qualitatively similar and do not affect 
any inferences.  
 
Although the results imply that accruals quality and its subcomponents play statistically and 
economically significant role in determining equity cost of capital, it is generally accepted in 
the asset-pricing literature that a significant factor loading in time series regressions is insuffi-
cient evidence to conclude anything about the pricing of that particular risk factor. For exam-
ple, Core et al. (2008) argue that the average positive coefficient of the AQfactor in contem-
poraneous regressions of stock returns on factor returns does not as such imply that accruals 
quality is a priced risk factor. Rather, they argue that the positive coefficient means that firms 
on average have a positive exposure to AQfactor, or more precisely, an investment strategy 
mimicking accruals quality premium. 
5.2 Cross-sectional OLS regressions 
In the previous section, I verified the results obtained by Francis et al. (2005) that the factor 
loadings of total AQfactor, as well as Innfactor and Disfactor are on average positive and sta-
tistically significant. However, to conclude that a specific risk factor is priced, it is necessary 
to establish that stocks with higher loadings on that factor earn higher future returns. For this 
purpose, I employ Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-stage cross-sectional regressions (2SCSR) 
method, where excess returns are regressed on the ȕ-coefficients from the first-stage regres-
sions, i.e. the time series factor loadings. The Fama–MacBeth (1973) method is well estab-
lished and provides a standard test of whether different explanatory variables are on average 
priced (See e.g. Fama and French 1992). The test procedure is two-fold: in the first stage, for 
each test asset i, factor loadings are estimated in multivariate time series regressions as in 
Equation (3). In the second stage, these ȕ-estimates are then used as input explanatory varia-
bles in the monthly cross-sectional regression to estimate the Ȗ -coefficients for each of the test 
assets. Therefore the equation estimated at time t becomes:  
 
 ܴ௜௠ െ ܴி௠ = ߛ଴௠ + ߛଵ௠ߚመ௜ெ௄் + ߛଶ௠ߚመ௜ௌெ஻ + ߛଷ௠ߚመ௜ுெ௅ + ߛସ௠ߚመ௜஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥+ ߛହ௠ߚመ௜ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥ + ߛ଺௠ߚመ௜஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ + ߣ௜௠ (4) 
 
Where Ⱦ෠௜௞ is asset i’s coefficient estimate for that particular risk factor obtained from the first 
stage time series regression model. There is a trade-off between using individual stocks and 
portfolios as test assets in the (2SCSR) tests. Namely, the time series ȕ-estimates obtained for 
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individual stocks have a stronger test power due to greater cross-sectional variation in the 
second stage, but they are imprecise estimates of the true betas causing errors-in-variables 
(EIV) bias, thus leading to understated standard errors (Kim 1995). On the other hand, time 
series betas estimated at portfolio level lead to weaker test power in examining the explanato-
ry power of the betas for the cross-sectional variation of average returns (see e.g. Shanken 
1992). In addition, when the ȕ-estimates are obtained at portfolio level, the true betas are not 
likely to be the same for all stocks in the portfolio, further reducing the power of the test 
while increasing EIV bias (Fama and French 1992).  
 
Additionally, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) argue that there might be even more serious problems 
arising from using portfolios as test assets in classical statistical tests. Namely, these problems 
are that creating portfolios based on some of the stocks’ empirical characteristics may create 
potentially significant biases in the test statistics and lead to misleading inferences about the 
empirical associations under review. Indeed, the results in asset-pricing environment may be 
quite sensitive to how the test portfolios are constructed. Moreover, as suggested by Kim and 
Qi (2010), the issue of beta measurement error in the first stage of the 2SCSR procedure can 
be to some extent resolved by using a long time series in the estimation. For the above men-
tioned reasons, I use individual stocks rather than portfolios as test assets in the 2SCSR tests. 
However, in section 5.2.2 I further extend the analysis by employing the assigned beta meth-
od as suggested by Fama and French (1992). This criticism does by no means suggest that the 
results from previous empirical work using portfolios as test assets should not be trusted. For 
example Fama and French (1993; 1996) use portfolios as test assets in their tests of the estab-
lished three-factor model.  
 
Kim and Qi (2010) show in their analysis, that the pricing of accruals quality is seriously dis-
torted by low-priced stocks. They discuss the importance of controlling for low-priced returns 
because of the bias in the measurement of realized returns of these stocks. This bias may be 
introduced by noise-trading, sentiment-trading, and market-microstructure induced effects. 
The biased returns of low-priced stocks have been shown to spuriously exaggerate market 
anomalies. For example, Bharwaj and Brooks (1992) show that the January effect is primarily 
a low share price effect rather than a small firm effect, whereas Ball et al. (1995) argue that 
profits of contrarian strategies21 are largely attributable to returns of low-priced stocks. Fur-
                                                 
21 Contrarian strategies are portfolio strategies that that are long in extremely low-priced “loser” stocks and short 
in high-priced “winner” stocks (e.g. Jagadeesh and Titman 1993). 
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thermore, as low-priced stocks are often traded inactively, their prices are unlikely to reflect 
all available information in the market, and thus the pricing effect of accruals quality would 
be difficult to detect even if it existed. Consequently, the exclusion of low-priced stocks is not 
unusual in the asset-pricing literature (see e.g. Jagadeesh and Titman (2001), who exclude 
low-priced stocks in their evaluation of explanations for momentum-strategies). Motivated by 
this discussion, I screen out all stocks with a quotation of less than 5 dollars for two adjacent 
months. The total percentage of these low-priced stocks in the CRSP population during the 
sample period is around 25%. 
5.2.1 Cross-sectional regressions using individual firms as test assets 
Table VI Panel A documents the results from monthly 2SCSR regressions over the period of 
January 1970 through December 2006. The ȕ-estimates are based on the whole-period return 
observations of 19,82622 firms. The reported coefficients ߛොҧ௞ are the time series averages of the 
444 monthly cross-sectional regressions, and can be regarded as the risk premium estimate of 
that particular risk factor. However, as the explanatory variables in the cross-sectional regres-
sions are time series factor loadings, assessing their effects on expected returns is somewhat 
cumbersome. To mitigate concerns about cross-sectional dependencies in the data, t-statistics 
are computed using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure (see Appendix 3 for details). 

Model (1) regresses cross-sectional excess returns on Ⱦ෠ெ௄் and Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥. The average coef-
ficient estimate of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥  of 0.278 is significant at 10% (t-statistic = 1.72). I augment 
Model (2) to include the factor loadings on SMB and HML. The average coefficient estimate 
of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ of 0.285 remains relatively unchanged, while being significant at 10% (t-statistic 
= 1.70). In Models (3) and (4), I replace Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ by Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥ and Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥. The average 
coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥ of 0.299 and 0.294 are larger than that of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥, imply-
ing a higher risk premium attached by the market compared to total accruals quality. The co-
efficient estimates however, are just short from being significant (t-statistics = 1.55; 1.51). 
The average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ (-0.009; -0.014) are negative, suggesting that 
discretionary accruals quality has a negative effect on equity cost of capital. However, the 
average ߛ-estimates are close to zero in both economic and statistical terms. All the other var-
                                                 
22 This reduction in sample size is clearly less than 25%, which is because of the fact that I use all available re-
turns observations to estimate the time-series betas, and screen the low-priced stocks only before the second-
stage cross-sectional regression. 
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iables are positively associated with excess returns, apart from Ⱦ෠ுெ௅, which is consistent with 
the results of Kim and Qi (2010). The models explain on average between 6.0% and 9.5% of 
the variation in excess returns.  
 
In Panel B, I report the results using 60-month rolling windows to estimate the time series 
betas in the first stage. The ȕ-estimates obtained from rolling-window regressions have the 
potential to be updated with more recent risk information, while on the other hand, may yield 
more imprecise estimates and thus cause bigger EIV problems. Similarly to Model (1), Model 
(5) regresses cross-sectional excess returns on Ⱦ෠ெ௄் and Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥. The average coefficient 
estimate of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ of 0.309 is significant at 1% (t-statistic = 2.78). When Ⱦ෠ௌெ஻ and Ⱦ෠ுெ௅ 
are added in Model (6), the average coefficient estimate of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ increases to 0.453, while 
the statistical significance also increases considerably (t-statistic = 4.16). In Models (7) and 
(8) Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥  is replaced by Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥  and Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ . The average coefficient estimates of 
Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥ are 0.439 in (7) and 0.474 in (8) (t-statistics = 3.51; 3.87), which are again margin-
ally larger than that of the coefficient estimate of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥. The average coefficient estimates 
of Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥  of -0.056 and -0.057 are again negative and significant at 1% (t-statistics =         
-2.94; -3.15). This supports the notion that the market prices discretionary accruals quality, 
while perceiving that discretionary accruals on average improve accounting quality, while 
also being consistent with the performance measurement hypothesis of Guay et al. (1996). 
While it is difficult to say anything specific about how much the market places emphasis on 
discretionary accruals in its pricing determination, the magnitudes of the average coefficient 
estimates of Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥  range between 8 times (0.439/-0.056 in Model (7)) and 33 times 
(0.299/-0.009 in Model (3)) smaller compared to the average coefficient estimates of 
ɀොூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥, suggesting that the accruals quality attributable to innate factors dominate the pric-
ing effects of total accruals quality. The models (5) through (8) explain between 3.8% and 
4.6% of the variation in excess returns, which is surprising given the fact that they are more 
likely to explain excess returns based on recent information than the models (1) through (4).  
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Table VI: Firm-specific cross-sectional regressions 
Table VI 
 Firm-specific cross-sectional regressions 
  
Panel A: ȕ-estimates based on whole sample period betas 
 
 
ߛҧ଴ 
Intercept 
ߛҧଵ (Ⱦ෠ெ௄்) ߛҧଶ (Ⱦ෠ௌெ஻) ߛҧଷ (Ⱦ෠ுெ௅) ߛҧସ (Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧହ (Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧ଺ (Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥) Adj. R2 
  (1) 0.563 0.472   0.278   0.060 
 (4.99)
*** (2.09)**   (1.72)
*    
         
(2) 0.600 0.389 0.360 -0.301 0.285   0.086 
 (6.98)
*** (1.74)* (2.13)** (-1.93)* 1.70*    
         
(3) 0.544 0.493    0.299 -0.009 0.071 
 (4.91)
*** (2.17)**    (1.55) (-0.18)  
         
(4) 0.588 0.405 0.361 -0.303  0.294 -0.014 0.095 
 (6.98)
*** (1.81)* (2.16)** (-1.95)*  (1.51) (-0.27)  
 (Continued on the next page) 
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Panel B: ȕ-estimates based on 60-month rolling betas 
 
 
ߛҧ଴ 
Intercept 
ߛҧଵ (Ⱦ෠ெ௄்) ߛҧଶ (Ⱦ෠ௌெ஻) ߛҧଷ (Ⱦ෠ுெ௅) ߛҧସ (Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧହ (Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧ଺ (Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥) Adj. R2 
  (5) 0.979 -0.049   0.309   0.038 
 (7.06)
*** (-0.36)   (2.78)
***    
         
(6) 0.926 0.009 0.322 0.124 0.453   0.042 
 (7.00)
*** (0.07) (3.58)*** (1.48) (4.16)***    
         
(7) 0.941 -0.045    0.439 -0.056 0.040 
 (6.83)
*** (-0.33)    (3.51)
*** (-2.94)***  
         
(8) 0.840 0.008 0.253 0.157  0.474 -0.057 0.046 
 (6.34)
*** (0.06) (2.74)*** (1.87)*  (3.87)
*** (-3.15)***  
 *,**, and *** signify 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance levels, respectively. The monthly two-stage cross-sectional regressions (Fama-MacBeth 1973) are estimated 
by using individual stocks. First stage coefficient estimates on factor returns (Ⱦ෠ ௜௞) are obtained from firm-specific multivariate time series regressions. The whole period Ⱦ-
estimates are estimated for 19,826 firms in Panel A, and the 60-month rolling Ⱦ-estimates for 18,017 firms estimated up to month t - 1 in Panel B. I require a stock to have at 
minimum 24 returns observations. Low-priced stocks (stock price under $5 for two adjacent months) are excluded from the sample. The reported coefficients ɀොത୩ and Adj. R2s 
are the averages of 444 monthly cross-sectional second stage regressions between January 1970 and December 2006. T-statistics (reported in the parenthesis) are based on the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  
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5.2.2 Cross-sectional regressions employing the assigned beta method 
In order to verify the robustness of the results in Table VI, I repeat the analysis in this section 
using the assigned beta approach introduced by Fama and French (1992). This approach is 
similar to the one used in Table VI, apart from the fact that time series beta estimates are ob-
tained from time series regressions of portfolio returns on the proposed risk factor returns, 
instead of individual stock returns. Full period post-ranking betas are then assigned to each 
stock in that portfolio at time t. The assigned beta approach thus allows changes in those ȕs 
whenever the particular stock moves in the portfolio ranking. A stock can move across portfo-
lios with year-on-year changes in the variable by which the portfolios are sorted. The portfolio 
level ȕ-estimates are then used as explanatory variables in Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions for individual stocks. In that sense, the approach mitigates the estimation 
errors of beta in the first stage time series regressions by using portfolios, while still maintain-
ing high test power by using individual stocks in the second-stage cross-sectional regressions.  
 
I employ two sets of portfolios commonly used in the asset-pricing literature. First, I construct 
100 portfolios based on the market value of equity (Size portfolios). Following the method 
used by Fama and French (1992), I determine the portfolio breakpoints in the last month be-
fore the start of the measurement period, that is, I sort all firms in March in year t by the mar-
ket capitalization to calculate the equal-weighted average portfolio returns from April in year t 
to March in year t + 1. Each stock then remains in that particular portfolio for the next twelve 
months, meaning that these portfolios are rebalanced annually. Second, I form 10 by 10 inde-
pendently cross-sorted portfolios on market value of equity and book-to-market ratio (Book-
to-Market portfolios). I measure book- and market values of equity in December t - 1 to calcu-
late book-to-market, and market value of equity in March of year t to calculate size. These 
breakpoints are then used to form portfolios for April t to March t + 1 measurement period23. I 
                                                 
23 One should note that Fama and French (1992) sorted firms into portfolios based on December book-to-market 
ratios for measurement in July of year t to June of year t + 1. While this procedure is very conservative and as-
sumes a minimum of 6 months’ delay before new information is impounded into stock prices, it would be likely 
to bias the regression coefficient of AQfactor, or alternatively, Innfactor and Disfactor, towards zero. Think, for 
example a situation where a firm’s earnings quality has dramatically dropped during the last fiscal year, resulting 
in a bounce in its AQ metric. If the firm’s fiscal year ends in December, the firm is required to file its financial 
statements latest at the end of March. Assuming the capital markets are adequately efficient, they would penalize 
the firms due to the drop in its earnings quality, leading to a decline in its share price. Consistent with the effi-
cient market hypothesis however, the change in the share price would occur immediately the new information is 
released, and not affect the firm’s returns after the release. If the firm’s returns are then measured from July of t 
through June of t + 1, the returns should not reflect the firm’s poor earnings quality, thus biasing the coefficient 
of AQfactor (or alternatively Innfactor and Disfactor) towards zero. For this reason, and the fact that when I 
calculate AQ factor returns, I assume information to be available three months after the fiscal-period end, I form 
the portfolios here three months before the beginning of the measurement period.  
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screen out all stocks with a stock price less than 5 dollars prior to constructing the portfolios, 
leaving a total of 22,664 firms in the measurement period of January 1970 through December 
200624. Monthly excess returns are then calculated for each portfolio p, and these returns are 
regressed on the risk factor returns as in Equation (3), only here the time series betas are based 
on portfolio returns.   
 
In Panel A of Table VII, I report the results from cross-sectional regressions using ȕ-estimates 
based on the 100 Size portfolio returns. Model (1) regresses portfolio excess returns on Ⱦ෠ெ௄் 
and Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥. The magnitude of the average coefficient estimate of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ is positive at 
0.310 but insignificant (t-statistic = 1.20). The inclusion of Ⱦ෠ௌெ஻ and Ⱦ෠ுெ௅ in Model (2) in-
creases the average coefficient estimate of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ to 2.434 which is highly significant (t-
statistic = 7.31). Models (3) and (4) present the average regression results when Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ is 
replaced by Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥  and Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ . The average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥  of 
0.952 and 2.643 are larger than that of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥, as is also the case in Table VI, while being 
significant at 1% (t-statistics = 3.38; 7.64). The average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ of 
0.150 and 0.038 are positive, but not statistically different from zero.  
 
In Panel B, I document the results from regressions using the portfolio time series ȕ-estimates 
obtained from 10x10 Size - Book-to-Market portfolios as explanatory variables. Models (5) 
and (6) regress cross-sectional excess returns on the one- and three factor model loadings re-
spectively. The average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥  are 0.666 and 0.722, both being 
significant at 1% (t-statistics = 3.27; 3.44). Further, in Models (7) and (8) Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ is re-
placed by Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥ and Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥. The average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥ are 0.439 
in (7) and 0.474 in (8) (t-statistics = 3.51; 3.87), which are again marginally larger than that of 
Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥. The average coefficient estimate of Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ on the other hand, is negative at -
0.083 in Model (7) with an insignificant t-statistic. However, in Model (8) the average coeffi-
cient estimate of Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ is -0.222 which is significant at 5% (t-statistics = -2.23).  
 
Similarly to the results in Table VI, the magnitudes of the average coefficient estimates of 
Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥  are considerably lower in absolute values than the coefficient estimates on 
                                                 
24 The sample size is marginally larger than in Tables V and VI, because in this context I impose no minimum 
requirement of 24 return observations during the sample period. 
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Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥. Specifically, they range between 5 times (1.134/-0.222 in Model (8)) and 70 times 
(2.643/0.038 in Model (4)) smaller compared to the average coefficient estimates of 
Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥, providing systematic evidence that innate factors dominate the determination pric-
ing effects of total accruals quality. 
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Table VII: Portfolio cross-sectional regressions 
Table VII 
Portfolio cross-sectional regressions 
  
Panel A: ȕ -estimates based on returns on 100 Size portfolios 
 
 
ߛҧ଴ 
Intercept 
ߛҧଵ (Ⱦ෠ெ௄்) ߛҧଶ (Ⱦ෠ௌெ஻) ߛҧଷ (Ⱦ෠ுெ௅) ߛҧସ (Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧହ (Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧ଺ (Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥) Adj. R2 
  (1) 4.445 -3.835   0.310   0.013 
 (12.31)
*** (-9.17)*** 
  
(1.20)    
         
(2) 2.967 -2.075 0.226 -1.100 2.434   
0.015 
 (7.99)
*** (-4.99)*** (1.32) (-3.93)*** (7.31)*** 
   
         
(3) 4.204 -3.573    
0.952 0.150 0.014 
 (11.82)
*** (-8.58)*** 
   
(3.38)*** 1.61  
         
(4) 2.917 -2.015 0.244 -1.251  
2.643 0.038 0.016 
 
(7.86)*** (-4.73)*** (1.42) (-4.37)*** 
 
(7.64)*** (0.39)  
 (Continued on the next page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Panel B: ȕ-estimates based on 10x10 Size - Book-to-Market portfolios 
 
 
ߛҧ଴ 
Intercept 
ߛҧଵ (Ⱦ෠ெ௄்) ߛҧଶ (Ⱦ෠ௌெ஻) ߛҧଷ (Ⱦ෠ுெ௅) ߛҧସ (Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧହ (Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥) ߛҧ଺ (Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥) Adj. R2 
  (5) 3.816 -3.052   0.666   0.022 
 (10.36)
*** (-8.06)***   (3.27)
***    
         
(6) 3.832 -3.003 0.297 0.442 0.722   0.027 
 (12.17)
*** (-8.06)*** (1.71)* (2.63)*** (3.44)***    
         
(7) 3.726 -2.967    1.017 -0.083 0.024 
 (12.38)
*** (-8.51)***    (4.22)
*** (-0.73)  
         
(8) 3.503 -2.672 0.223 0.464  1.134 -0.222 0.028 
 
(11.13)*** (-7.14)*** (1.29) (2.80)***  (4.88)
*** (-2.23)**  
 *,** and *** signify 10%, 5% and 1% two-tailed significance levels respectively. All firms are sorted every year into 100 Size portfolios (Panel A) and 10x10 Size - Book-to-
Market ratio portfolios (Panel B). Equal-weighted portfolio excess returns are then calculated monthly for each portfolio, and these portfolio excess returns are regressed on 
the risk factor mimicking portfolio returns in order to estimate the portfolio time series betas (Ⱦ෠௣୩). Portfolio Ⱦ-estimates are then assigned to each of the stocks that were 
included in the portfolio at time t, as in Fama and French (1992). Low-priced stocks (stock price under $5 for two adjacent months) are excluded from the sample. The report-
ed coefficients ɀොത୩ and Adj. R2s are the averages of 444 monthly cross-sectional second stage regressions between January 1970 and December 2006. T-statistics (reported in 
the parenthesis) are based on the Fama-MacBeth (1973) standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  
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The results in Table VII are surprising in the sense that in each of the model specifications, 
the coefficient on Ⱦ෠ெ௄்  is negative, suggesting that market beta is inversely related to ex-
pected returns, which is exactly the opposite to the basic assumptions underlying the CAPM. 
The negative (and also large) estimates of the market risk premium are not rare in the asset-
pricing literature however, and have been found for example in Fama and French (1992), Jan-
nathan and Wang (1996), and Petkova (2006). Also recall, that the use of SMB and HML as 
additional pricing factors arose in part because Fama and French (1992) demonstrated the lack 
of evidence that the market beta is priced.  
 
Other than that, the results are generally consistent with the ones reported in Table VI, and 
suggest that AQ is a priced risk factor, while its pricing effects may be mainly attributable to 
innate accruals quality. When the ߛ-estimates are based on the 100 Size portfolios, it seems 
that Disfactor is not related to excess returns. The results in Panel B however suggest that 
discretionary accruals quality lowers equity cost of capital, consistent with the results in Table 
VI. The negative pricing effect of discretionary accruals quality is consistent with the results 
documented by Guay et al. (1996), who find that their regressions of returns on discretionary 
accruals yield on average negative slope coefficients. Finally, it seems that although the coef-
ficient estimates are generally larger in the magnitude when the ߛ-estimates are obtained using 
the assigned beta approach, the models’ ability to explain the variation in excess returns is 
considerably lower compared to when the time series gammas are estimated on individual 
firm level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
6 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the results from the regression analyses presented in the previous sections will 
be discussed in more detail. The evidence obtained for each of the hypotheses will be consid-
ered, while the results are connected to previous research.  
 
The results based on the regressions provide consistent evidence to the first hypothesis that 
earnings quality is a priced risk factor. I show in Table V that AQfactor, that is, the factor 
return on a portfolio buying the poorest 40% AQ stocks and selling the best 40% AQ stocks 
loads significantly on firm-specific time series regressions of excess-returns on the three Fama 
and French (1993) factor returns augmented with the AQfactor. While Francis et al. (2005) 
conclude mostly based on similar results that AQ is a priced risk factor, I acknowledge the 
criticism presented in Core et al. (2008) that this kind of test setup does not directly test the 
hypothesis whether AQ is priced, but rather means that on average firms have a positive con-
temporaneous exposure to the AQfactor mimicking strategy. These results however, show that 
adding AQfactor to the regression increases the average Adj. R2 of the model by about 10%, 
suggesting that exposure to the AQfactor is a determinant of contemporaneous returns. How-
ever, it can also be seen that AQfactor’s effect on returns is partly overlapping with SMB (the 
size factor), as is also suggested by the strong pair-wise correlation between the two factor 
returns reported in Table IV.   
 
In order to gain stronger evidence for the pricing effect of total accruals quality, I examine the 
AQfactor loadings’ ability of to explain returns in two-stage cross-sectional regressions as in 
Fama and MacBeth (1973), and find consistent evidence that AQ is priced in the cross-section 
of firms. I consider both individual firm betas and portfolio betas assigned to individual firms 
as in Fama and French (1992), and find that apart from one specification proposed the average 
coefficients of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥  are positive and statistically significant. Even the specification 
where the coefficient of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ is not significant, it is positive and larger in magnitude than 
in some of the other specifications with a significant coefficient estimate. The results are ro-
bust compared to e.g. the coefficient estimates on the market risk premium (MKT) in which 
the coefficient estimates are negative throughout all the specifications documented in Table 
VII and two of the specifications documented in Table VI. Although the effect of total accru-
als quality on expected returns are difficult to interpret based on the 2SCSR results, I observe 
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in Table II that the worst AQ sorted decile portfolios earn on average over 3% higher annual-
ized returns than the best AQ sorted decile portfolios. In addition, in Table IV I report a mean 
monthly risk premium for the AQfactor of 0.165%, implying an annualized risk premium of 
over 2%. Overall, my results support the evidence found in the prior literature that infor-
mation quality affects cost of capital  (e.g. Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004; Francis et al. 
2005; Aboody et al. 2005; Ecker et al. 2006; Ogneva 2008; Kim and Qi 2010). As my tests 
rely on the pricing implications of the systematic component of accruals quality, the results 
also suggest that this pricing effect cannot be eliminated by portfolio diversification. 
 
While many theoretical models establish that expected returns are affected by information risk 
(e.g. Easley and O’Hara 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia 2005), they do not really attempt to point 
out the mechanism through which information risk affects returns. I test my second hypothesis 
by decomposing total accruals quality into innate accruals quality and discretionary accruals 
quality as in Francis et al. (2005). InnAQ is the component of accruals quality that is attribut-
able to fundamental risk, whereas I assume that DisAQ measures “pure” information risk aris-
ing exclusively from managerial discretion. I find in Table V, that substituting Innfactor and 
Disfactor for AQfactor increases the explanatory power of the model only marginally, sug-
gesting that investors may be unable or at least challenged to incorporate this additional in-
formation introduced by the two factor returns relating to accruals quality to their pricing de-
cisions. However, both Innfactor and Disfactor are significantly related to contemporaneous 
returns with positive average coefficient estimates. 
 
Consistent with my expectations and to support the hypothesis 2a), I find evidence from two-
stage cross-sectional regressions that innate accruals quality is significantly priced with the 
average coefficient estimates being positive in all specifications considered, apart from Table 
VI Panel A, where excess returns are regressed in the cross-section on firm-specific time se-
ries betas estimated from the whole sample period. However, even in these specifications, the 
average coefficient estimates are positive and just short from being significant at 10%. To my 
surprise, I find that the average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠ூ௡௡௙௔௖௧௢௥  are larger in magnitude 
compared to the average coefficient estimates of Ⱦ෠஺ொ௙௔௖௧௢௥ in each of the specifications con-
sidered. Further, I report a mean monthly risk premium for the Innfactor buying the poorest 
four InnAQ-sorted decile portfolios and selling the four best InnAQ-sorted portfolios of 
0.220%, implying an annualized risk premium of over 2.6%. The average risk premium for 
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Innfactor is thus larger than that for total AQfactor. First of all I interpret these results as be-
ing consistent with the results of Liu and Wysocki (2007) and Chen et al. (2008), that while 
accruals quality is priced, its pricing effects may be mainly attributable to fundamental risk 
factors. This however, doesn’t alone explain why the pricing effects are stronger for Innfactor 
than for total AQfactor. Guay et al. (1996) argue that managers use discretionary accruals to 
offset the effect of economic shocks to nondiscretionary earnings. If this argument holds true, 
then it would be expected that the pricing effect of total accruals quality would be smaller 
than the pricing effects of innate accruals quality, because total accruals have been 
“smoothed” by discretionary accruals. While I cannot be completely certain of the reason why 
the market perceives the exposure to innate accruals quality more risky than the exposure to 
total accruals quality, this explanation seems most plausible. 
 
I also find that AQfactor and Innfactor are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 
0.962. A correlation coefficient this high is surprising even given the fact that InnAQ is repre-
sented as the fitted value from a linear regression of total AQ on its innate components (bear 
in mind the results in Table I showing that the model explains on average less than half of the 
variation in AQ). Anyhow, the high correlation between the factor returns provides additional 
evidence that the pricing effects of AQfactor and Innfactor are to a large extent overlapping. 
 
While the findings on the pricing effects of total accruals quality and innate accruals quality 
are consistent, the findings are somewhat mixed as far as discretionary accruals quality is 
concerned. Particularly, in Table IV I document a mean monthly risk premium for the factor 
loading formed by DisAQ (Disfactor) of -0.071%, which, while insignificant in both econom-
ic and statistical terms, implies that discretionary accruals quality is negatively related to con-
temporaneous returns. This finding could be consistent with DeFond and Park (2001), who 
find that the abnormal component of accruals is negatively associated with future stock re-
turns measured during the 80 trading day period following earnings announcement. However, 
the results in Table V show that while the other risk factors are controlled for, Disfactor turns 
positively related to contemporaneous returns. The average coefficient estimate, while being 
statistically significant at 1%, is considerably lower compared to that of AQfactor and Innfac-
tor in both economic and statistical terms. Finally, the results from the 2SCSR regressions 
suggest that the factor loadings of Disfactor (Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥) are on average negative and also sig-
nificant in three of the specifications considered. However, when the factor loadings are esti-
mated for 100 Size portfolios (in Table VII Panel A), the average coefficient estimates of 
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Ⱦ෠஽௜௦௙௔௖௧௢௥ turns positive but insignificant. As discussed in the beginning of section 5.2, the 
results from two-stage cross-sectional regressions may be quite sensitive to the sorting criteria 
of the portfolios for which the time series betas are estimated. Nonetheless, as the average 
coefficient signs of Disfactor loadings are not consistent across the regressions specifications, 
I do not interpret these results as being particularly strong evidence that discretionary accruals 
quality is negatively related to expected returns.  
 
The results also suggest that when total AQ is decomposed into its innate and discretionary 
components, the model proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) (Equation 2) and later em-
ployed by e.g. Francis et al. (2005) and Kravet and Shevlin (2010) may be seriously misspeci-
fied. I base this argument on the fact that in Table III, where I consider other variables than 
those proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) that are likely to affect fundamental risk of 
firms, I find that each one of these variables either increase or decrease almost monotonically 
with AQ sorted decile portfolios, indicating a high correlation of AQ with these variables. I 
leave further analysis on this subject to future research to address, but at the same time note 
that adding incremental explanatory variables to the decomposition regressions of AQ into its 
subcomponents would improve the fit of Equation (2), while decreasing the variation of resid-
uals, i.e. the proxies for discretionary accruals quality. I believe that this would have consider-
able implications on asset-pricing tests examining whether discretionary accruals quality is 
priced. Particularly, as the variation in DisAQ would reduce, so would the compositions of 
portfolios sorted by DisAQ become more random, leading to a reduction in Disfactor’s ability 
to explain returns. That being said, I find evidence to support my Hypothesis 2 b) that the 
pricing implications are different for innate accruals quality and discretionary accruals quality, 
while the pricing implications for the latter are considerably smaller in economic terms. How-
ever, the results found in this thesis are inconclusive to reject the hypothesis presented by 
Guay et al. (1996) that discretionary accruals are just noise in earnings.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examines the interplay between earnings quality, information risk, and cost of cap-
ital. The research question is motivated by considerable interest among accounting researchers 
toward the subject especially during the latter half of last decade. The findings in the prior 
literature are mixed as regards to whether information risk is a priced risk factor and should be 
added as an explanatory variable in asset-pricing tests. Further, prior literature pays little at-
tention to the mechanism through which information risk affects cost of capital. This last sec-
tion concludes the study by presenting a summary of key findings. In addition, reliability and 
validity of the results are assessed alongside with a few suggestions for future research. 
7.1 Summary of findings 
Employing an extensive sample from the US market in 1970-2006, I find that AQ, the proxy 
for total accruals quality is a significantly priced risk factor. The results are based on regres-
sions of monthly excess returns on factor returns of one- and three factor models augmented 
with an additional risk factor constructed as the AQ hedge portfolio return long in the poorest 
accruals quality firms and short in the best accruals quality firms. Using a factor return instead 
of using AQ as a firm-specific characteristic ensures that the pricing effect does not disappear 
even if investors fully diversify their portfolios. I employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-
stage cross-sectional regression approach, and find that the pricing effect of total AQ is robust 
to whether the factor loadings are estimated on individual firm level or portfolio level, as well 
as to two alternative commonly used portfolio formation criteria. The regression results do not 
have implications as regards the magnitude of the proposed risk premium, but the descriptive 
analysis documents a mean annualized risk premium for the AQfactor of about 2.0%. Based 
these results, it seems that there is some truth to the notion popular both in the accounting 
literature and on Wall Street, that earnings numbers have different qualities. It also seems that 
rational investors are capable of incorporating the information on earnings quality to their 
pricing decisions. 
 
Following prior literature, I further decompose the AQ metric into its innate and discretionary 
components in order to analyze their pricing effects separately. InnAQ represents the compo-
nent of accruals quality that is attributable to fundamental risk, whereas DisAQ represents 
information risk arising exclusively from managerial discretion. I form factor mimicking port-
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folios based on these variables, and find from similar analysis than for total AQ, that InnAQ is 
significantly priced, with its average coefficient estimates even larger than those for total AQ. 
I interpret from these results that the pricing effect of total accruals quality may be mainly 
attributable to innate factors, such as firm size and operating volatility. Furthermore, the factor 
returns on total accruals quality and innate accruals quality are highly correlated. Finally, I 
find weak and inconsistent evidence that discretionary accruals quality is negatively related to 
expected returns. However, its average regression coefficients range between 5 times and 70 
times smaller than those for innate accruals quality, implying economic significance close to 
zero, even though the coefficient estimates are statistically significant in some of the specifi-
cations considered. 
7.2 Limitations of the study 
The first argument on the reliability of the results relates to the AQ metric and its subcompo-
nents. Since AQ is measured as the standard deviation of firm-specific residuals, it does not 
take into account whether accruals over- or underestimate economic earnings. Moreover, it 
overlooks the order in which the residual accruals occur. For example, if there is a steadily 
increasing trend in the residual accruals, their derivation from the past years data would theo-
retically be easy and should not be a cause of increased information risk. This problem could 
be completely avoided by calculating the standard deviation of residuals from the changes in 
residuals instead of the levels. However, in this thesis the AQ metric was calculated based on 
the levels of the residuals solely for the purpose of comparability with previous literature. 
Second, the literature knows multiple proxies for earnings quality, and not all of them are 
likely to be suitable for every situation. For example, managerial ownership is associated with 
low earnings quality using asymmetric timeliness as the proxy but with high earnings quality 
using discretionary accruals or investor responsiveness as the proxy (Dechow et al. 2010). 
 
The study was conducted using an extensive sample of US data. The results may not be valid 
overseas or globally for two reasons: first, the US markets provides a unique test setting when 
it comes to size and data availability. These issues are of critical importance for the study at 
hand because of the extensive data requirements posed by the accruals quality proxies. It ap-
pears plausible that the fact that almost all of the empirical research conducted on the subject 
has been done using US data is caused by data availability. If the residual accrual models 
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were estimated using smaller sample sizes or shorter time series estimation periods, the resid-
uals would likely be larger thus artificially making the impression of poorer earnings quality.  
 
Another concern regarding the generalizability of these results concerns the infrastructure of 
capital markets. The assets that are being traded must be liquid enough and free from high 
transaction costs to be able to reflect the pricing effects of the proposed earnings quality risk 
factors. This is not likely to be a problem in this study, or any study conducted in the US mar-
ket, but especially in the developing economies it is by no means certain that security prices 
reflect all available information, thus impeding the efficiency of asset-pricing tests. However, 
one should note that for a specific firm, earnings quality may still be able to affect expected 
returns especially in the absence of complete diversification in the economy. 
7.3 Suggestions for future research 
My first suggestion for future research concerns studying the pricing effects of discretionary 
accruals quality using a specific sub-sample of firms. As the findings in this thesis show, there 
are no consistent asset-pricing implications for discretionary accruals quality. However, based 
on the extensive literature on discretionary accruals, it appears likely that discretionary accru-
als are not just noise in earnings. Thus, my suggestion is to find sub-samples of firms for 
which the managerial motives for discretionary accruals are parallel. For example, prior to 
stock offering managers may be motivated to opportunistically pump up earnings using dis-
cretionary accruals in order to boost the stock price. On the contrary, in a CEO change setting 
the new CEO may be motivated to take a “bloodbath” and use discretion to write down the 
values of all or some non-performing assets. As the first example is likely to deteriorate earn-
ings quality, while the second is likely to improve it, their expected pricing effects would be 
opposite and likely to cancel each other out in the long time period as the managerial motives 
change. Thus, to gain a better understanding of the pricing effects of discretionary accruals 
quality, one should be able to separate a sub-sample of firms whose managers are driven by 
convergent motives. 
  
My second recommendation for future research concerns the interplay between earnings qual-
ity and other potential causes of information risk. For example auditor, analyst following, 
market liquidity, concentration of ownership, proprietary costs and voluntary disclosures are 
all subjects that alongside earnings quality are likely to affect total perceived information risk 
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of firms. Particularly, as discussed in section 4.2.1, all the proposed variables are at least al-
most monotonically related to AQ. Thus, it would be interesting to examine how adding addi-
tional risk variables to the model decomposing AQ into InnAQ and DisAQ would change the 
pricing effects of the two later mentioned. However, studying this topic could be challenging 
in the sense that our understanding in still limited when it comes to distinguishing innate earn-
ings quality risk from fundamental risk.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 Appendix 1 
Average monthly returns of the InnAQ and DisAQ sorted decile portfolios 
 Panel A: Innate AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
 
InnAQ 
Portfolio  
Average 
InnAQ  
Return 
(%)  Beta  
Market 
Cap  
Book-to-
Market*1  Price ($) 
  1  0.011  1.21  0.81  6396  2.54  36.32 
2  0.020  1.28  0.93  2701  1.77  31.35 
3  0.026  1.33  0.99  1745  1.32  25.92 
4  0.032  1.35  1.02  1034  1.23  21.22 
5  0.038  1.34  1.06  617  1.18  17.15 
6  0.044  1.44  1.08  386  1.21  13.30 
7  0.051  1.36  1.12  278  1.20  10.63 
8  0.060  1.52  1.16  198  1.18  8.46 
9  0.073  1.56  1.20  139  1.12  6.72 
10  0.113  1.63  1.30  99  0.88  4.96   Average  0.047  1.40  1.07  1361  1.37  17.60 
             
P10 - P1  0.102  0.43  0.48  -6297  -1.66  -31.36 
t-statistic  46.42
**  1.27  50.95
**  -21.26
**  -16.64
**  -119.22
** 
 
Panel B: Discretionary AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
 
DisAQ 
Portfolio  
Average 
DisAQ  
Return 
(%)  Beta  
Market 
Cap  
Book-to-
Market*1  Price ($) 
  1  -0.050  1.56  1.20  191  1.14  7.38 
2  -0.024  1.46  1.08  295  1.17  11.88 
3  -0.016  1.31  1.03  482  1.20  15.72 
4  -0.010  1.42  1.01  693  1.22  18.22 
5  -0.006  1.42  0.99  1129  1.28  20.90 
6  -0.002  1.39  0.99  1569  1.50  22.80 
7  0.003  1.36  1.02  2497  1.56  22.60 
8  0.009  1.38  1.06  2968  1.70  22.38 
9  0.019  1.24  1.10  2660  1.66  20.91 
10  0.063  1.49  1.18  1133  1.23  13.15 
  Average  0.000  1.40  1.07  1361  1.37  17.60 
             
P10 - P1  0.112  -0.07  -0.02  942  0.08  5.77 
t-statistic  41.41**  -0.67  -3.10**  18.43**  3.38**  41.96** 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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All firms with available InnAQ (Panel A) and DisAQ (Panel B) metrics are assigned to one of the ten decile 
portfolios based on their most recent value of that metric. Portfolio 1 (10) contains firms with the smallest (larg-
est) values. InnAQ is the fitted value from regressions of total AQ on size, the standard deviation of operating 
cash flow and sales, change in revenue, and PPE. DisAQ is the corresponding residual from those regressions.  
Return (%) is the equal-weighted average of the portfolio firms’ monthly raw returns. Beta is calculated as the 
average of the 6,144 firm-specific beta estimates obtained from the whole sample period market-model regres-
sions, where the estimation period is at minimum 24 months. Market Cap is the average market capitalization in 
$ millions of the firms in the portfolio. Book-to-Market is the average of book equity to market equity ratios of 
the firms in the portfolio. Price is the average dollar-price of the shares in the portfolio. The Average row repre-
sents the sample means of the 7,266 firms for which AQ can be calculated between January 1970 and December 
2006. P10 – P1 is the difference between the averages of the largest and the smallest AQ portfolios, along with t-
statistics of zero difference. *, ** denote 5% and 1% significance levels. *1 signifies extreme values being winso-
rized to 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Appendix 2 
Selected characteristics of the innate AQ and discretionary AQ sorted decile portfolios 
 
Panel A: Innate AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
 
InnAQ 
Portfolio  Size
*1  ı(CFO)
*1  ı(Sales)
*1  
OperCy-
cle*1  NegEarn  
R&D 
ratio*1  
Sales 
growth*1  
Lever-
age*1  ROA
*1  BIG4 
  1  7.91  2.43  9.33  98.10  2.09  2.47  10.31  30.12  2.74  95.23 
2  6.87  3.63  14.16  115.32  3.15  2.66  10.34  25.27  3.05  94.07 
3  6.18  4.57  16.65  130.31  4.62  2.96  10.48  22.77  3.13  92.51 
4  5.70  5.51  19.34  139.21  6.39  3.23  10.80  22.57  3.02  91.17 
5  5.24  6.51  22.16  144.17  8.80  3.58  10.95  22.68  2.79  88.85 
6  4.85  7.54  25.34  148.23  12.10  3.88  11.08  22.80  2.50  86.60 
7  4.47  8.79  28.79  154.93  16.30  4.28  10.99  23.57  2.19  84.37 
8  4.11  10.49  33.63  162.50  22.38  4.97  11.11  24.63  1.76  79.63 
9  3.75  13.43  40.03  166.62  30.59  5.87  12.53  24.64  1.22  77.93 
10  3.18  23.53  51.90  186.94  45.24  8.76  18.30  25.84  -0.33  74.45   Average  5.22  8.65  26.13  144.64  15.17  4.32  11.69  24.49  2.21  86.47 
                     P10 - P1  -4.73  21.10  42.56  88.84  43.15  6.29  
 7.99  -4.28  -3.07  -20.78 
t-statistic  -120.37
**  53.96**  159.97**  51.14**  69.04**  23.91** 
 
 17.91**  -11.52** 
 
 -32.45**  -39.27** 
(Continued on the next page) 
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 Panel B: Discretionary AQ-sorted decile portfolios 
 
DisAQ 
Portfolio  Size
*1  ı(CFO)
*1  ı(Sales)
*1  
OperCy-
cle*1  NegEarn  
R&D 
ratio*1  
Sales 
growth*1  
Lever-
age*1  ROA
*1  BIG4 
  1  3.80  17.59  41.80  163.94  33.97  6.86  15.31  25.36  0.85  76.70 
2  4.55  9.73  30.98  150.72  18.60  4.61  11.48  24.35  2.00  84.38 
3  5.01  7.60  25.72  140.15  13.10  3.84  10.60  24.53  2.34  86.33 
4  5.34  6.64  22.42  137.20  10.43  3.57  10.38  24.61  2.52  87.59 
5  5.70  6.21  20.77  133.19  9.54  3.47  10.86  24.80  2.59  88.63 
6  5.98  5.85  19.27  131.25  8.64  3.45  10.92  25.22  2.62  90.27 
7  5.97  6.17  20.25  134.95  9.37  3.67  11.23  24.36  2.64  89.86 
8  5.86  6.63  21.86  140.72  10.54  3.87  11.05  23.74  2.63  89.25 
9  5.50  7.99  24.53  150.36  13.85  4.65  11.85  23.52  2.32  87.92 
10  4.53  12.07  33.78  164.00  23.66  5.86  13.16  24.39  1.50  83.53  Average  5.22  8.65  26.13  144.64  15.17  4.32  11.69  24.49  2.21  86.47 
                     P10 - P1  0.73  -5.52  -8.02  0.06  -10.30  -1.00  -2.16  -0.97  0.64  6.83 
t-statistic  38.50
**  -24.90** 
 
 -37.91**  0.10  -41.09**  -7.72**  -9.58**  -7.87**  16.39**  37.94** 
All firms with available InnAQ measures (Panel A) and DisAQ measures (Panel B) are assigned to one of ten decile portfolios based on their most recent value of that metric. 
Portfolio 1 (10) contains firms with the smallest (largest) value. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ millions. ı(CFO) (ı(Sales)) is the rolling standard deviation of 
a firm’s operating cash flow (sales) in percentages from the last ten years, however, at minimum five years. OperCycle is the length of a firm’s operating cycle, measured as 
the sum of days in accounts receivable and days in inventory. NegEarn is the %-frequency of negative earnings before extraordinary items during the past ten years. R&D 
ratio is research and development expense divided by total assets expressed in percentage terms. Sales growth is the %-change in a firm’s sales revenue between years t - 1 
and t. Leverage is the ratio of a firm’s total debt to total assets. ROA is earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets. BIG4 is the proportion of firms in the portfo-
lio, who were audited by one of the BIG4 audit firms. The Average row represents the sample means of the 7,266 firms for which InnAQ and DisAQ can be calculated be-
tween January 1970 and December 2006.  P10 – P1 is the difference between the averages of the largest and the smallest AQ portfolios, along with t-statistics of zero differ-
ence. *, ** denote 5% and 1% significance levels.*1 signifies that the distribution of the variable has been winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Appendix 3. Derivation of the Fama-MacBeth diagnostics 
 
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure calculates the average ߛ-estimates as the time series 
mean of the coefficient estimates from each of the cross-sectional regressions: 
 
 
ߛҧ௜ =  1ܶ෍ߛො௜௧்
௧ୀଵ
 (A1) 
 
To mitigate concerns of cross-sectional dependence in the data, t-statistics are computed 
based on time series standard errors (Mertens 2002): 
 
 
ݐƸ(ߛҧ௜) = ߛҧ௜ߪො(ߛҧ௜) (A2) 
 
where: 
   
 
ߪො(ߛҧ௜) = ඩ 1ܶ(ܶ െ 1)෍(்
௧ୀଵ
ߛො௜௧ െ ߛҧ௜)ଶ (A3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
